Last August 2007, this author filed Senate Bill No. 1467 entitled “An Act Defining the Archipelagic Baselines of the Philippine Archipelago, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 3046, as Amended by Republic Act No. 5446.” or otherwise known as the “Archipelagic Baselines Law of the Philippines.” The bill was the result of a series of consultations primarily with former Senator Leticia Ramos-Shahani, who first pushed for the Baselines bill way back in 1987. It basically defines the archipelagic baselines to include the Scarborough Shoal and designates the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) as a “regime of islands.” To facilitate the passing of the bill, the technical details provided by the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA) as enumerated in House Bill No. 1202 filed by Congressman Antonio V. Cuenco as well as its other provisions were adopted in toto. Congress, however, filed HB 3216 that substituted for HB 1202.

Recently, controversies arose with the discovery of the particulars of the Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) being conducted by RP, China and Vietnam within the waters off Palawan. Thereafter, Malacanang pressured Congress to revert HB 3216 to the Committee on Foreign Relations ostensibly to push for certain amendments. These two seemingly unrelated events inevitably pushed the baselines issue at the top of the national policy agenda. Given this context, now is the best time for us to finally resolve this issue.

This paper intends to explain and justify the position adopted in SB 1467 and differentiate it with the other options, as well as to clarify other closely related subjects surrounding the baseline issue.

PD 1599, TREATY OF PARIS and UNCLOS

The first time the author studied the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) agreement was in 1994 as part of a course in International Law given to graduating cadets of the Philippine Military Academy who intend to join the Philippine Navy. The course focused on the UNCLOS provisions particularly: the archipelagic doctrine; the coastal state’s rights and duties within the territorial sea, contiguous zone and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ); the right of innocent passage; the doctrine of hot pursuit; and other provisions concerning enforcement of maritime laws.

After graduating, however, the new Navy officers were surprised to find out that the NAMRIA-supplied nautical charts used aboard Philippine Navy ships defined the territorial limits of the country as those stated in the Treaty of Paris plus the attached KIG borders defined by PD 1596, and not the UNCLOS definitions as taught to them at PMA. To be fair, NAMRIA has no other basis than the Treaty of Paris because our country, precisely, has yet to pass a new baselines law that would amend the pre-UNCLOS baseline law, the RA 5446, which is not compliant with the UNCLOS criteria. To complicate matters, the Navy uses PD 1599, a pre-UNCLOS unilateral declaration of our country’s EEZ, as a mandate to enforce maritime laws in these areas. As a consequence, the author remembers that when their ship patrolled as far east as the Anson Shoal in the Pacific, they used the Treaty of Paris as reference. And when they patrolled as far west as the Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea, they used PD 1599. In short, as of the moment, we have two sets of boundaries (PD 1599 and Treaty of Paris with PD 1596) and we will yet define another one (UNCLOS).

1. PD 1599, as mentioned above, is a unilateral declaration by the Philippines of its EEZ as measured from the baselines as defined by RA 5446. It was signed by then Pres. Ferdinand Marcos on 11 June 1978.

2. The Treaty of Paris is a peace treaty forged between the US and Spain in 10 December 1898. It detailed, among others, the territorial limits of the Philippine archipelago as being ceded by Spain to the US. These same limits were then used to define our national territory when we eventually gained independence from the US in 1946.

3. The UNCLOS, formally known as the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea or UNCLOS III and also called the Law of the Sea Convention, refers to the international agreement that came out of the UN conferences from 1973 to 1982. The agreement consists of 320 articles and 9 annexes. To date, 155 countries have already ratified the UNCLOS and it officially came into force in 16 November 1994. The Philippines became the 11th country to ratify UNCLOS on 08 May 1984. It defines, among others, the limits of the territorial sea, contiguous zone and the EEZ of a coastal or archipelagic State.

Each of the above reference options has its own strengths and weaknesses, but if we are to consider both the validity in International Law and the area covered, the UNCLOS option is superior to the other two.

PD 1599, while almost as vast as the UNCLOS option in terms of area, has practically no binding effect in International Law by virtue of its being a unilateral declaration in the pre-UNCLOS era. Moreover, since we have ratified UNCLOS and, therefore, agreed to its provisions, we are obliged to rescind PD 1599.

The Treaty of Paris, meanwhile, may still have a binding effect in International Law, notwithstanding the UNCLOS ratification. However, its total area covered is significantly smaller because it cannot avail of the EEZ provisions of the UNCLOS.

As to the legal alternative of retaining the Treaty of Paris while availing of the UNCLOS option, we, as a self-respecting people living within a community of nations, should not have two sets of boundaries that we can use for our own convenience. It is simply not fair; it is simply not right. Therefore, it is in our country’s best interest to adopt solely the UNCLOS option.

The Baseline Methods

Baselines are reference lines drawn by a coastal or archipelagic State using different methods as discussed below. They are used to measure the breadth of the territorial sea (12nm), contiguous zone (24 nm), EEZ (200nm) and continental shelf (up to 350nm). Also, the waters enclosed by the baselines are called archipelagic waters over which an archipelagic State exercises sovereignty.

According to the UNCLOS, there are three methods that can be employed in determining a State’s baselines, namely:

1. Normal Baseline, according to Art. 5, “is the low-water line along the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State.”

2. Straight Baseline, according to Art. 7, can be employed if ever “the coastlines are indented and cut into or there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity.”

3. Archipelagic Baseline, according to Art. 47, is a method of “joining the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of an archipelago provided that within such baselines are included the main island and an area in which the ratio of the area of the water to the area of the land, including atolls, is between 1:1 and 9:1.”

Of the three methods, the archipelagic baselines method is most applicable and advantageous to an archipelago such as ours. Otherwise, to use either the Normal or Straight baseline methods, which are primarily designed for coastal States, would effectively waive our status as an archipelagic State and lose much of the archipelagic waters as defined above.

The Baseline Options

NAMRIA has prepared the following baseline options to cater to the varying political persuasions of the policymakers:

OPTION 1: The main archipelago and Scarborough Shoal are enclosed by the baselines while KIG is classified as regime of islands. This is the option adopted by SB 1467.

OPTION 2: Only the main archipelago is enclosed by the baselines while KIG and Scarborough Shoal are classified as regime of islands. This is the official position of Malacanang through recent pronouncements and the DFA position paper written on 02 Aug 2005.

OPTION 3: The main archipelago and KIG are enclosed by the baselines while Scarborough Shoal is classified as regime of islands.

OPTION 4: The main archipelago, KIG and Scarborough Shoal are enclosed by the baselines. This is the option adopted by HB 3216.

To have a better view of the differences between the baseline options, the table below (which includes RA 5446) was lifted from the briefing documents prepared by NAMRIA.

The Baseline Options

RA 5446: There are a few weaknesses in RA 5446. One, it violates para 2 of Art. 47 of UNCLOS where it states: “The length of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles except that up to 3 percent of the total number of baselines enclosing the archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum of 125 nautical miles.” As we can see from the table, RA 5446 has one baseline that exceeds the 125nm limit for long baselines.

Another weakness of RA 5446 is: it does not optimize the area of the EEZ since it excluded both Scarborough Shoal and KIG from the baselines and both were not designated as regime of islands.

OPTION 1/ SB 1467: The main strength of this option is that it maximized the area by including Scarborough Shoal without violating the archipelagic baselines provisions by classifying KIG as regime of islands. It is, therefore, UNCLOS compliant.

However, there are some misconceptions regarding the label “regime of islands” that it supposedly weakens our claim or reduces our sovereignty over the areas labeled as such. On the contrary, “regime of islands” is defined in Art. 121 as: 1) island/s that is naturally formed, surrounded by water and is above water at high tide; and 2) it shall have its own 12nm territorial sea, 24nm contiguous zone, 200nm EEZ and continental shelf. In other words, islands classified as regime of islands are treated the exact same way as other land territory. The only possible reason that coastal States would be forced to classify their territory as a regime of islands is because such territory is impossible to enclose within the baselines without violating other UNCLOS provisions. The Falkland island group is one example. Since the UK is at the other end of the Atlantic which made it impossible to include Falkland in its own baseline, it has no choice but to classify Falkland as a regime of islands. The US (if ever it ratifies UNCLOS) would probably classify Hawaii as a regime of islands by virtue of its distance from the mainland.

The Scarborough Shoal was included in the baselines primarily because its distance from Luzon is less than the 125nm limit. With this, our country stands to gain approximately 14,500sq nm of EEZ and continental shelf. Another reason for its inclusion is that Scarborough Shoal is basically a rock and according to para 3 of Art. 121, the regime of islands definition has an exception and that is: “Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.” Therefore, while it is advantageous for us to designate KIG as a regime of islands, we would be depriving ourselves of the EEZ and continental shelf of Scarborough Shoal if it would be designated as a regime of islands.

Of course, China is expected to protest the inclusion of Scarborough Shoal within our baselines. Probably, it may even be the reason why Malacanang pressured Congress to freeze legislative action on HB 3216. But if we truly believe that our claim over Scarborough Shoal is legitimate, then we have every right to enclose it within our baselines. This does not mean, though, that we are provoking China into a war because, according to Art. 279, State Parties to the UNCLOS are obliged to settle any dispute by peaceful means.

OPTION 2/MALACANANG OPTION: The main weakness of this option is, while it is UNCLOS compliant, it failed to protect the interest of our country by not including Scarborough Shoal in the baselines when there is no hindrance to do so. True, this option designates Scarborough as a regime of islands but, as discussed above, a rock formation is not entitled to an EEZ and continental shelf when labeled as such. Even if it will still have its own territorial sea and contiguous zone, these would have no effect in terms of additional area since the EEZ measured from west coast of Luzon will extend over these zones.

OPTION 3: There are several weaknesses with this option. Aside from those mentioned in Option 2 with the designation of Scarborough Shoal as regime of islands, this option is also not UNCLOS compliant for including KIG in the baselines. This will be discussed extensively below since Option 4 also included KIG in the baselines.

OPTION 4/HB 3216: At first glance, this may seem to be the best option. However, it violated para 4 of Art. 47 which states: “Such baselines shall not be drawn to and from low-tide elevations, unless a lighthouse or similar installations which are permanently above sea level have been built on them or where a low-tide elevation is situated wholly or partly at a distance not exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the nearest island.” Based on the table above and HB 3216 itself, Sabina Shoal and Iroquois Reef are low-tide elevations. A low-tide elevation, according to Art. 13, “is a naturally formed area of land which is surrounded by and above water at low-tide but submerged at high tide.” Hence, we still need to construct a lighthouse each on these areas so that they can qualify as basepoints. Even this measure, however, is no longer possible because of the “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea” which was signed by the ASEAN members and China in 2002. In the declaration, we agreed “to exercise self- restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability including, among others, refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features and to handle their differences in a constructive manner.” Both Sabina Shoal and Iroquois Reef are presently uninhabited but are being claimed by RP, China and Vietnam.

Another major defect of Option 4/HB3216 is, as we can see from the table, seven of the designated basepoints are islands presently occupied by other countries. According to the Digital Gazetteer of the Spratly Isands, these are: Kalantiaw Cay (Vietnam); Paredes Reef (Vietnam); Kagitingan Reef (China); Mariveles Reef (Malaysia); Pugad Is. (Vietnam); Kanluran Reef (Vietnam) and Investigator Reef (being claimed by China). To insist on using these islands/reefs as basepoints is in contravention of the 2002 ASEAN- China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and may cause outrage among affected States. Designating basepoints on uninhabited, though contested areas such as Scarborough Shoal can be defended legally and politically. But to place basepoints on foreign-occupied territory, no matter how strong our claim, is an act of aggression.

If the proponents of Option 4/HB 3216 have not yet realized this, then the information provided by this paper, hopefully, will make them reconsider.

In view of the discussions above, the best option to adopt is Option 1 as stated in SB 1467.

The Spratly Issue

As explained above, the passing of SB 1467 will not weaken our claim over the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) or what is internationally known as the Spratlys. Still, the fact remains that, we are only one of many claimants in that group of islands. Of these, only Brunei has not physically occupied its claimed territory. According to the Digital Gazetteer of the Spratly Islands (it admits the reports are varying), Vietnam has occupied 25 islands; China, 13; RP, 8; Malaysia, 5; and Taiwan, 1.

With this situation, it is impossible to expect a scenario where all these countries will just suddenly pack up and go home. On the contrary, we should even expect some of these claimants to assert their presence more in the coming years to explore potential oil deposits amidst the increasing demand and diminishing oil reserves elsewhere. In such a scenario, skirmishes are not unlikely as our Navy ships and fishing boats are regularly navigating these waters. In the meantime, nobody gets to benefit from whatever rich natural resources the area has to offer.

There are several avenues enumerated in the UNCLOS as regards conflict settlement, foremost of which is the mutual agreement of all claimant States. But after factoring in the unpleasant experiences (including our own) of countries conducting joint development agreements with China (Wain 2008), it may be best to strengthen ties within the ASEAN first. This way, our collective position would be at parity with China in any future agreement. This is the only peaceful way to resolve this issue.

The JMSU Issue

The Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) was initially entered into by RP and China on 01 Sept 2004. Vietnam initially voiced concern as it was a violation of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (Wain 2008). But at some point, Vietnam was won over when it was included in the project. Because of this, it is now officially called a Tripartite Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking in The Agreement Area in the South China Sea.

The JMSU agreement is highly flawed for the following reasons:

1. It smacks of bad faith on our part as it was forged without consulting with the other members of the ASEAN while there was an existing status quo agreement among them. (Wain 2008).

2. It excluded other claimant States like Brunei, Malaysia and Taiwan.

3. It was grossly disadvantageous on our part because it included areas that were not disputed.

4. Because some subject areas are solely ours, it violated certain provisions of Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution relating to the exclusive use of our own marine wealth or, if it is a joint exploration, the President’s obligation to submit such agreement to Congress within 30 days.

5. We are not at parity with China in terms of the actual conduct of the exploration since we are relegated to mere observers aboard their research vessels. Hence, there can be no guarantees about the integrity of the research results.

The Continental Shelf

According to para 1 of Art. 76 of the UNCLOS, “the continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200nm from the baselines from which the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance.”

According to para 6 to 8 of Art. 76, a coastal State is allowed to claim the outer limits of a continental shelf beyond the 200nm but not exceeding 350nm from the baselines as long as the information on the said limits are submitted to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). The CLCS would then make the recommendations to the coastal State regarding the outer limits and the adoption of which would make it final and binding.

Art. 4 of Annex II, on the other hand, states: “Where a coastal State intends to establish, in accordance with Art. 76, the outer limits of its continental shelf beyond 200nm, it shall submit particulars of such limits to the Commission along with supporting scientific and technical data as soon as possible but in any case within 10 years of the entry into force of this Convention for that State.”

Since the UNCLOS officially entered into force on 16 November 1994, supposedly, the ten-year deadline would have expired on 15 November 2004. However, because of the difficulties encountered by developing countries in coming up with technical requirements of Art. 4 of Annex II, a decision was made during the May 2001 Meeting of State Parties to UNCLOS to extend the deadline to 12 May 2009. (Sands 2005: 5).

With this, our country has a little over a year to submit the particulars of our continental shelf beyond the 200nm to the CLCS. Thus, it is imperative that all pertinent institutions of government provide and extend all the necessary support to NAMRIA to make sure that it accomplishes its mission on time.

To compound this deadline problem, we still do not have a new baselines law from which to measure the outer limits of our continental shelf. While there is no deadline in the submission of particulars for a State’s baselines, it is, however, the basis for measuring all maritime regimes including the extended continental shelf (VERA Files 2008). Therefore, we should pass the new baselines bill even way before the 12 May 2009 deadline to give NAMRIA ample time to adjust their data on our continental shelf, assuming that it would have the necessary data by then.

The Sabah Claim

The approval of SB 1467 is without prejudice to our existing claim on Sabah. Although the bill is not as explicit as Sec. 2 of RA 5446 where it mentioned that RP has dominion and sovereignty over Sabah, still Sec. 5 of SB 1467 states that the baselines law shall be without prejudice to other claims. To be sure, Article I of the 1987 Constitution has already covered our claim over Sabah and other similarly situated territories and no law can possibly override this Constitutional provision.

Having said that, the Sabah claim will always be a lingering issue for as long as we will not be brave enough to confront it. Sadly, all the administrations since 1986 refused or lacked the political will to resolve it.

As things stand, our country has a strong existing legitimate claim over Sabah, on behalf of the heirs of the Sultanate of Sulu. On the other hand, Malaysia had been in actual possession and control over the island for more than a century now and, worse, the inhabitants of Sabah have expressed their desire to remain under Malaysian rule. Hence, it is very unlikely that Malaysia would give up its claim even with extreme pressure from the international community.

Maintaining status quo may be the preferred option of our past and present National leaders so as to avoid either being accused of selling-out our interests, or creating tension in diplomatic ties with Malaysia. However, maintaining status quo is favorable to Malaysia as they continue to possess, control and exploit Sabah. Moreover, as time passes by that the issue is not resolved, the farther removed are we from the actual circumstances on how Malaysia got to possess Sabah in the first place, which is essential to proving our claim. And, of course, the heirs of the Sultanate of Sulu are continuously deprived of their inheritance.

War is definitely not an option not only because our armed forces are ill-equipped for such an endeavor but, more importantly, because we, as a people, have not reached and is nowhere near the level of nationalism and patriotism necessary for launching a politically, socially and economically costly undertaking such as a full-scale war with another country.

Pragmatically, therefore, the only option to resolve the Sabah issue is a compromise settlement between RP, Malaysia and the heirs of the Sultanate of Sulu. The author concedes, however, that even this option would not be easily accomplished but then again, reasonable men will always reach a point of agreement.

Recommendations

1. Push for the passing of SB 1467 and its counterpart in Congress before May 2009 so that there will be a basis for measuring the outer limits of the territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf. More importantly, so that our country can now officially claim the limits of our National Territory that is consistent with the international covenant of UNCLOS.

2. Push for the submission of particulars of the outer limits of the continental shelf to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf before the 12 May 2009 deadline by supporting NAMRIA and other concerned agencies in their data gathering.

3. On the assumption that recommendations 1 and 2 as stated above are achieved, we should do the following:

A. Modernize our fishing methods and technologies;

B. Invest heavily on marine scientific research and exploration of the EEZ and

continental shelf;

C. Reach out to other claimant States of the contested territories in order to

settle disputes and come up with an agreement for joint exploration and development so that all these States can finally benefit from the abundant natural resources in these areas.

D. Comply with the other UNCLOS obligations of an archipelagic State.

4. Modernize the Navy and Coast Guard. Logically, the next step after having firmly and clearly established our territory is to protect it. Aside from the basic demands of naval defense, we should increase our capability for maritime law enforcement operations.

5. Conduct a legislative inquiry on the Tripartite Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking.

Conclusion

As shown in the discussions above, the baseline issue is quite technical and highly complex because of the interplay with other equally important national security, economy and foreign policy issues. But after carefully analyzing these issues separately, this paper tried its best to come up with reasonable and feasible courses of action which, hopefully, would be given due consideration. Still, everything starts when we finally make a stand, as a Nation, by defining the limits of what is truly ours and what will be good for our country now and in the generations to come.

References

2008. VERA Files (Tordesillas, Ellen et.al.). “Arroyo neglect, government infighting jeopardize RP’s territorial claim.” 24 March 2008. Downloaded from www.ellentordesillas.com.

2008. Wain, Barry. “Manila’s Bungle in The South China Sea.” Far Eastern Economic Review. January/February 2008.

2008. Digital Gazetteer of the Spratly Islands. Downloaded from http://community.middlebury.edu.

2008 NAMRIA Nautical Chart No. 4723 (provisional copy). Philippines.

2007. Trillanes, Antonio IV F. Senate Bill No. 1467: An Act Defining the Archipelagic Baselines of the Philippine Archipelago, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 3046 as Amended by Republic Act No. 5446. Senate of the Philippines.

2007. Cuenco, Antonio V. House Bill No. 1202: An Act Defining the Archipelagic Baselines of the Philippine Archipelago, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 3046 as Amended by Republic Act No. 5446. Congress of the Philippines.

2007. Cuenco, Antonio V. et.al. House Bill No. 3216: An Act Defining the Archipelagic Baselines of the Philippine Archipelago, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 3046 as Amended by Republic Act No. 5446. Congress of the Philippines.

2005. Sands, Philippe. “Introductory Note on Issues Concerning Rights/Obligations and Deadlines Under Part XI of UNCLOS in Relation to the Extended Continental Shelf.” Written for the Meeting of Commonwealth Law Ministers and Senior Officials. Ghana. 17-20 October 2005.

2005. Department of Foreign Affairs. Position Paper: “Determination of Baselines.” 02 Aug 2005.

2005. “Joint Statement on the Signing of a Tripartite Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking in the The Agreement Area in the South China Sea.” Makati, Philippines. 14 March 2005. Downloaded from http://china- japan21.org.

2004. NAMRIA Nautical Chart No. 4200. Philippines.

2004. Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking in Certain Areas in the South China Sea By and between China National Offshore Oil Company And Philippine National Oil Company. Beijing, China. 01 September 2004.

2002. “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.” Phnom Penh, Cambodia. 04 November 2002.

1999. Zou, Keyuan. “Scarborough Reef: A New Flashpoint in Sino-Philippine Relations?” International Boundaries Research Unit. Canada.

1987. Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.

1982. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 10 December 1982.

1978. Presidential Decree No. 1596: Declaring Certain Area Part of the Philippine Territory and Providing for their Government and Administration. Philippines. 11 June 1978.

1978. Presidential Decree No. 1599: Establishing an Exclusive Economic Zone and for Other Purposes. Philippines. 11 June 1978.

1968. Republic Act. No. 5446: An Act to Amend Section One of Republic Act. No. 3046, Entitled “An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the Philippines.” Philippines. 18 September 1968.

1961. Republic Act No. 3046: An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the Philippines. Philippines. 17 June 1961.

1898 The Treaty of Paris. France. 10 December 1898.

* Other presentation documents, tables, charts and illustrations provided by NAMRIA.

Background

The occupation of Oakwood Hotel by protesting junior officers and men last July 27, 2003 placed the issue of military interventions at the forefront of public policy agenda, specifically how best to prevent them from recurring. This policy issue paper reviews the present policies adopted by the Arroyo Administration to prevent military interventions, and assesses whether these should be pursued or not.

THE PROBLEM: MILITARY INTERVENTION

Military intervention is an act by active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, outside the conventions of the chain of command, with the intent of disrupting the political status quo, in the pursuit of their political cause.

Military interventions, not to mention their sometimes-bloody consequences, have debilitating effects on our economic and political stability. Given our present precarious social-economic-political state, we cannot afford another military intervention.

There were common/significant causes extracted from the nine major military interventions our country has so far experienced. These causes are categorized into two, internal and external. Internal causes are those attributable to or directly affecting the military organization; while, external causes are those attributable to factors external to the military. The internal causes were: (1) corruption in the AFP; (2) inept AFP leadership; (3) political patronage in promotions; (4) lack of logistical support for men in the field; (5) low pay; and (6) poor medical/health services. While the external causes were: (1) corruption in government; (2) incompetent leaders in the administration; (3) failure of the administration to deliver basic services; (4) widespread poverty; (5) state- sponsored terrorism; and (6) electoral fraud by the administration.

ASSESSMENT OF PRESENT EFFORTS TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM

The present policies being adopted by the Arroyo Administration to prevent military interventions are the recommendations made by the Feliciano Fact-Finding Commission (FFFC).

Based on the evaluation using the criterion of political viability, most of the present policies were assessed to be unresponsive to the underlying causes of the Oakwood Incident and therefore, will not prevent future military interventions.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Continue with the implementation of the following FFFC recommendations, which were found to be responsive or useful:

A. Creation of a cabinet-level agency (e.g. The Presidential Adviser on Military Affairs) directly under the Office of the President. It should have oversight powers and clear inter-department relationships with all concerned to prevent overlapping functions. This office will also conduct the appropriate policy researches to further flesh out the more complicated problems enumerated below as well as other internal causes not raised in this paper.

B. The propositions regarding the Retirement and Separation Benefits System (RSBS), Procurement System, AFP Modernization, AFP Medical Services, and AFP Housing.

2. Review the other FFFC recommendations as to their responsiveness to the causes of military interventions

3. Conduct policy researches on the following:

A. Eradication of corruption in the AFP

B. Rehabilitation of RSBS

C. Strict application of meritocracy in the AFP promotions system

D. Uplifting of the standard of living of the AFP personnel through:

1) Salary increase or non-monetary benefits such as, tax reductions/exemptions, reduction of RSBS contributions, rice subsidy, C-130 flights or ship passes for soldiers going on R & R, etc.

2) Improvement of medical and health services

3) Mass housing

E. Streamlining of the AFP bureaucracy.

4. Practice good governance to address the external causes of military intervention.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AdMU – Ateneo de Manila University

AFPAO – Armed Forces of the Philippines Administrative Order

C-in-C – Commander-in-Chief

CMF – Centrally-Managed Funds

CPP – Communist Party of the Philippines

CSAFP – Chief of Staff Armed Forces of the Philippines

DND – Department of National Defense

DOJ – Department of Justice

EDSA – Epifanio Delos Santos Avenue

FFFC – Feliciano Fact-Finding Commission

GCFI – Guardian Center Foundation Inc.

GHQ – General Headquarters

HQ – Headquarters

ISAFP – Intelligence Service Armed Forces of the Philippines

JUSMAG – Joint United States Military Assistance Group

MAB – Mactan Air Base

MBD – Makati Business District

NICA – National Intelligence Coordinating Agency

NOVAI – Navy Officers’ Village Association Inc.

NPA – New People’s Army

NSC – National Security Council

NUC – National Unification Commission

PAF – Philippine Air Force

PMA – Philippine Military Academy

PN – Philippine Navy

RA – Republic Act

RAM – Reform the Armed Forces Movement

R&R – Rest and Recreation

RSBS – Retirement Separation Benefit System Secretary of National Defense

SND – Secretary of National Defense

UNDP – United Nations Development Programme

PREVENTING MILITARY INTERVENTIONS

BACKGROUND: THE OAKWOOD INCIDENT

On July 27, 2003, the Filipino Nation became a witness to another socio-political phenomenon — the Oakwood Incident. More than 300 officers and men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) holed themselves up in a posh hotel in Makati to protest against the Arroyo Administration for massive corruption, selling of arms and ammunition to the enemies of the state, state-sponsored terrorist acts and widespread poverty.

This incident is the latest among numerous military interventions experienced by our country since the first one happened in December 1970, when then 1Lt Victor N Corpus raided the armory of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) en route to his eventual defection to the New People’s Army. The Oakwood Incident also happened two and a half years after EDSA II and almost fourteen years after the bloody 1989 coup attempt. With the latest incident, a question now lingers in the minds of a lot of Filipinos: “Is our country forever condemned to have these military interventions?”

This policy issue paper reviews the present policies adopted by the Arroyo Administration to prevent military interventions, and assesses whether these should be pursued or not.

SCOPE AND SEVERITY OF THE PROBLEM

The effects of military interventions on our country, not to mention its sometimes- bloody consequences, are debilitating to our economy and gravely affect our country’s political stability. During the 1989 coup attempt alone, in addition to the human casualties, the combined financial losses suffered by the economy ranged from P800 million to P1 billion (Davide, 1990: 378) and according to Secretary Manuel A. Roxas II, it “brought down our economy to nearly zero growth” (PDI, 2003: 1). Davide further wrote, “the loss of lives, loss of confidence and damage to our international image are worth far more than the financial losses” (Davide, 1990: 378).

As for the Oakwood Incident, just four days after, the peso fell to a new four- month low while stocks also fell to its lowest level within the past four weeks, thereby reflecting investors concerns over political and economic uncertainties (PDI Editorial, 2003: 8). According to columnist Armando Doronilla, it “unleashed a new blizzard of uncertainty over the economic and political horizons” (Doronilla, 2003: 9). Although the incident was brief with no bloodshed or damage to property, “it contributed to the projection of the Philippines as an unsafe, unstable and crisis-prone country” (Feliciano, 2003: Introduction).

While it is also true that history had been kind to two successful military interventions (EDSA I and II), the conditions that followed these exercises were not marked with peace and progress either. On the contrary, post-EDSA I and II were remembered for the attempts to restore the toppled administrations, such as the Manila Hotel Incident; the GMA-7 coup attempt; and the Black Saturday Mutiny to restore President Ferdinand Marcos, and the EDSA III Incident (although not a military intervention) to restore Pres Estrada. So, whether it is successful or not, a military intervention will produce a climate of political and economic instability, which retards the country’s growth and will sow division among the people.

PROBLEM STATEMENT

DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM

The problem addressed in this paper is how best to prevent military interventions. On the other hand, the issue addressed is whether to pursue the policies presently being adopted by the Arroyo Administration to prevent military interventions.

In addressing this issue, we will extract the root causes of past interventions in the Philippines and compare these with the present policies to determine if they are, indeed, responsive. If not, alternatives would be proposed to fill policy gaps and come up with a more responsive and more effective policy.

ACTORS/STAKEHOLDERS

The following are the actors/stakeholders of this policy:

1. Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)

The essence of any military intervention is obviously the military, in this case, the AFP. Thus, in this policy, the AFP and its personnel are the main recipients.

It is a safe assumption that no soldier in the AFP entered the service to become a rebel, much less a troublemaker who would want to drag his own country down. Obviously, the motivation to break away from the system is nurtured in the course of his career based on what he has witnessed or experienced. There are different motivations or causes cited by previous participants and some have been common to the different interventions. This is where a responsive policy comes in and, hopefully, addresses these causes so that the confusion about their roles never arises even under different circumstances.

2. President

The President is solely responsible for the implementation of this policy. As such, he is required to have a clear vision of what he wants for his country. He also needs to have a high level of political will, unquestionable moral integrity, and an honest desire to serve the people.

The failure to implement this policy will leave his administration open to interventionists and maybe rightly so, for he had failed to fulfill his mandate to serve, protect and uplift the lives of the people. But as what was discussed above regarding the dire economic consequences should this happen, the President, through the different government agencies, must ensure that this policy gets implemented.

Ultimately, the survival of not only his administration is at stake, but more importantly that of the State and Democracy itself. In fact, if we are to go by the events of the 1987 and 1989 coup attempts, even the President’s own life is at risk.

3. Business Sector

One of the biggest losers in any military intervention (both successful and failed) is the business sector. That is why they should be highly interested in any move to eradicate the problem. They should also be more participative in overseeing that this policy gets the necessary support it needs to be implemented properly. And since the business sector itself is partly to blame for the prevailing social injustice being experienced by the people, they must start subscribing to certain business ethics that will encourage benevolence within the sector and also do away with the exploitation of the masses.

4. The People

At the end of the day, it is the Filipino people in general that stand to lose most from the failure of this policy. Aside, from the direct losses to lives and property that they may absorb as collateral damage, they also stand to lose much should the economy falter as a result of a failed military intervention.

Generally, the public have grown apathetic regarding this issue because they feel that, either way, they will still have to contend with the harsh realities of daily living. This was proven to them by both the successful and failed interventions.

GOALS AND OBJECTIVE

The goals of this policy are: (1) to maintain political and economic stability in our country; (2) to promote social justice for our people; and (3) to breed a truly professional AFP. While, the objective of this policy is to directly address both the internal and external causes of military intervention to prevent its recurrence.

MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS

This policy proposes the prevention of military interventions; therefore, the ultimate measure of effectiveness can only be the non-recurrence of such activities in the future. But since the future is infinite, this policy is time-bound within the term of the administration that chooses to implement it. Ideally, it should be implemented for as long as Democracy exists in our country. But given the kind of public administration and politics we have, it is very rare that a policy, even a good one, gets institutionalized.

EVALUATION CRITERION 

It can be deduced from the discussions above that any effort to prevent military interventions should address all its direct causes. The rationale being, if there were no more causes to justify military intervention then this would be prevented from recurring. Considering the psyche of AFP officers and men, and the environment from which they operate, the cause is very important, for this is what they will risk everything, even their lives for.

The potential interventionists in the AFP ranks are no mercenaries. Neither would a soldier join just for the fun of it. Therefore, without a valid cause, it is highly improbable that a military intervention could be launched. This, in theory, is the approach in preventing military interventions.

From the description of the approach to the problem, it is very clear that the sole evaluating criterion applicable is political viability specifically, responsiveness. As defined by Patton and Sawicki: “Responsiveness is related to acceptability and appropriateness and involves the target group’s perception of whether the policy or program will meet its needs” (Patton, 1993: 216). It is with this criterion that the present efforts to solve the problem will be evaluated on. Likewise, if necessary, responsiveness would also be the basis in the formulation of other alternatives.

It is worth noting however, that based on the precedents set by EDSA I & II, the potential solutions should not prevent future military interventions that may be necessary, in only extreme cases (e.g. oppressive, corrupt and inept administrations and administrations that resort to electoral fraud to stay in power), to protect the people and the state, as stated in the 1987 Constitution.

MILITARY INTERVENTIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES

THE ROLE OF THE AFP

In discussing military interventions, we must first know the specific limitations of the AFP and its defined role in the state. The role of modern armed forces is primarily to subdue or prepare to subdue the enemies of the state, particularly external aggressors. But since the Philippines is a developing country, the AFP has other equally important roles: (1) providing stability to the political status quo, demonstrated through its role in the maintenance of law and order, and counter-insurgency; and (2) assisting in national development efforts (Davide, 1990: 10-11).

According to Conrado de Quiros: “the Army combined defense and police functions, mandated as it was to secure the state against external and internal attacks and to maintain peace and order” (de Quiros, 1990:26).

To appreciate the bounds within which the AFP is allowed to operate, we shall refer to its mandate as defined in the 1987 Constitution. As stated in Sec.3 of Art. II of the Constitution: “The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people and State.” The intention and spirit of this provision is to give constitutional mandate to the AFP to subvert an oppressive, corrupt and inept government, which is detrimental to the safety of the people and the survival of the state. Apparently, the framers of the 1987 Constitution deliberately inserted this because they were aware of the crucial role of the AFP in overthrowing President Ferdinand Marcos.

The delicate part however, is the subjective interpretation of this constitutional clause. As Davide wrote: “In essence, it is not the mission that pushes the military to intervene. Rather, it is how the officer corps defines and interprets the mission of the armed forces, which may give rise to the phenomenon of military interference in the political arena (Davide, 1990: 11).”According to Navy Captain Proceso Maligalig PN (Ret.), a participant in the 1989 coup attempt: “The military or ‘warrior’ class must step in to preserve and protect the State if and when the civilian counterpart fails or abdicates on the responsibility for credible governance” (Coronel, 1990: 55).

All doubts about the interpretation, however, were clarified during EDSA II when then AFP Chief of Staff General Angelo Reyes broke the chain of command and withdrew support from his Commander-in-Chief President Joseph Estrada citing this same constitutional provision. With the Supreme Court ruling and global recognition that followed, formally legitimizing the Arroyo Administration, military intervention is now justified, in extreme cases, as a means to change a democratically-elected administration. Intellectual honesty dictates that this is a historical fact and a legal precedent. Hence, the parameters that applied during the decision of then General Reyes must also be applicable throughout time unless, this provision is changed or removed from the Constitution.

Another constitutional provision defining the role of the AFP is Art. XVI, Sec. 5 (1), where it states: “All members of the armed forces shall take an oath or affirmation to uphold and defend this Constitution.” Again, this has been interpreted both ways. Those in the administration often recite this line to tame the AFP and make it do their bidding. On the other hand, the interventionists in the AFP use this line to call on the others to join them in invoking the Art II, Sec. 3 provision as stated above.

But again this has been clarified by the legitimization by the Supreme Court and the international community of the actions of then General Reyes.

MILITARY INTERVENTION DEFINED

Military intervention is defined as an act made by active members of the AFP, outside the conventions of the chain of command, with the intent of disrupting the political status quo, in the pursuit of their political cause. According to an AdMU paper: “The term ‘military intervention’ is habitually associated with a coup d’etat or a cuartelazo or a golpe de estado. These are, however, only types of military intervention – albeit the most extreme form” (AdMU, 2001). Military intervention can come in various forms: coup d’etat, rebellion, mutiny, sedition, protest action (e.g. the Oakwood Incident), and even through a simple press statement, as in the case of the Kawal Incident, where a group called Kawal Pilipino held a covert press conference in which they asserted that GMA is using the AFP against her political opponents in the May 2004 presidential election.

From this definition, we can delineate military intervention from other incidents involving the military. For example, a large group of AFP personnel who protested against their commander for his autocratic style of leadership is not a form of military intervention in the sense that it was done for purely non-political reasons. Martial Law is also not a form of military intervention since the military under this political setup is still operating under the AFP chain of command.

CAUSES OF MILITARY INTERVENTIONS

According to Davide: “Motives for military intervention are varied and complicated. No single factor can easily be pointed out as the sole cause for intervention. It is oftentimes a conjunction of motives” (Davide, 1990: 4). Thus, in extracting the causes that motivated some members of the AFP to intervene in Philippine politics, we will categorize them into two—internal and external. Internal causes are those attributable to or directly affecting the military organization; while, external causes are those attributable to factors external to the military (Davide 1990: 9).

1. December 1970 PMA Armory Raid

In December 1970, 1Lieutenant Victor N. Corpus led NPA rebels in a raid of an armory inside the Philippine Military Academy (Corpus, 1989). They carted away hundreds of infantry weapons before disappearing into the communist underground (McCoy 1999: 198). He eventually surrendered to the government in 1976 (Corpus, 1989).

INTERNAL CAUSES:

A. The misuse of the AFP by politicians against the interests of the people (Corpus, 1989);

B. Graft and corruption in the AFP (McCoy, 1999: 197).

EXTERNAL CAUSES:

A. The oligarchic structure of the Philippine society (McCoy, 1999: 197);

B. The leftist influences on 1Lt Corpus by the communist youth group, Kabataan Makabayan, (which he joined after graduating from PMA) and its ideologue, Jose Ma. Sison (McCoy, 1999: 197).

2. February 1986 EDSA I Mutiny

On February 22, 1986, then Minister of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile along with General Fidel Ramos and the members of the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) barricaded themselves inside the Ministry of National Defense building in Camp Aguinaldo and, thereafter, withdrew support from President Ferdinand Marcos. This triggered the so-called “EDSA People Power Revolution,” which eventually toppled the Marcos Administration on Feb 26.

According to Escalante, while many wished “to perpetuate a romanticized, scented image of EDSA I,” it “never was a revolution. It was a pocket mutiny that grew into a localized revolt, drawing the participation, cumulatively, of perhaps no more than five percent of the population (Escalante, 2000: 1).”

EDSA I was the first successful military intervention in the history of our country.

INTERNAL CAUSES:

A. Graft and corruption in the AFP (Davide, 1990: 120; and Coronel 1990: 51);

B. Political patronage in the AFP promotions system (Davide, 1990: 120; McCoy, 1999: 232; and Coronel, 1990: 56);

C. Lack of logistical support for the officers and men in the field (Davide 1990: 120);

D. Low pay of AFP personnel (Coronel, 1990: 51);

E. The schism between the officers belonging to the camp of General Fabian Ver and those who did not (Coronel, 1990:51 and de Quiros, 1990: 41).

EXTERNAL CAUSES:

A. The electoral fraud committed by President Marcos during the February 7, 1986 Snap Presidential Elections (Davide, 1990: 124);

B. Corruption and inefficiency in government (de Quiros, 1990: 41, 44, 45);

C. The alleged attempt to eliminate Enrile and Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) members by the forces of General Ver (de Quiros, 1990: 42; McCoy, 1999: 231; and Davide, 1990: 119, 122);

D. The deteriorating political and economic conditions after the Ninoy Aquino assassination in 1983 (Davide, 1990: 122; and Escalante, 2000: 15);

E. The consolidation of power by President Marcos through the subservience of the Batasang Pambansa; muzzling of the press; the weakening of the judiciary; and the total control of the military (Davide, 1990: 55 and de Quiros, 1990: 40);

F. The widespread social unrest due to dire economic conditions (de Quiros, 1990: 38).

3. July 1986 Manila Hotel Incident

In July 1986, Marcos loyalists occupied Manila Hotel, the symbolic center of party politics, to proclaim former Senator Arturo Tolentino, Marcos’ vice-presidential running mate, as Acting President of the new government (McCoy, 1999: 266-267). At least 490 military officers and men, and some 5,000 civilian Marcos loyalists were involved in the rebellion. They surrendered 37 hours later (Davide, 1990: 135-141).

INTERNAL CAUSES:

A. Discriminatory treatment of AFP personnel connected with the Marcos regime (Davide, 1990: 204);

B. The“soft-stance”oftheAquinoAdminstrationagainsttheCPP-NPA(Davide, 1990: 136);

C. The presence of leftists in the Aquino Cabinet (Davide, 1990: 136).

EXTERNAL CAUSES:

A. The counter-revolutionary fervor of Marcos loyalists (Davide, 1990: 137); B. Widespread social unrest (Davide, 1990: 136).

4. January 1987 GMA-7 Incident

On the early morning of January 27, 1987, AFP personnel loyal to deposed Pres Marcos struck various military and civilian targets that culminated in the siege of the GMA-7 compound in Quezon City (Davide, 1990: 158-165).

After almost three days, the rebels led by Air Force Colonel Oscar Canlas agreed to lay down their arms. One rebel soldier died and 35 people were injured during the incident. GMA-7 was also estimated to have lost at least P3 million in direct damages (Davide, 1990: 161, 165).

INTERNAL CAUSES:

A. Discriminatory treatment of AFP personnel connected with the Marcos regime (Davide, 1990: 161, 204);

B. The “soft-stance” of the Aquino Administration against the CPP-NPA (Davide, 1990: 161);

C. The presence of leftists in the Aquino Cabinet (Davide, 1990: 164);

D. The perceived ill treatment of the AFP by the Aquino Administration (Davide, 1990: 163).

EXTERNAL CAUSES:

A. The counter-revolutionary fervor of Marcos loyalists (Davide, 1990: 164);

B. The worsening political situation caused by the killing of protesting farmers in the so-called “Mendiola Massacre” on January 22, 1987 (Davide, 1990: 158).

5. April 1987 ‘Black Saturday’ Incident

On 18 April 1987, 13 enlisted personnel, all members of the Guardian Brotherhood, led by Technical Sergeant Ernesto Librado, forced their entry through Fort Bonifacio and went straight to the military stockade to free 42 military detainees, most of whom participated in the January 27 GMA-7 incident. They then raided an armory before barricading themselves inside the Headquarters Philippine Army building in Fort Bonifacio (Davide, 1990: 168-169).

The siege lasted 20 hours before the rebels agreed to surrender leaving one rebel dead and seven wounded (Davide, 1990: 168-170).

INTERNAL CAUSES:

A. The “soft-stance” of the Aquino Administration against the CPP-NPA (Davide, 1990: 170);

B. The presence of leftists in the Aquino Cabinet (Davide, 1990: 170).

EXTERNAL CAUSES:

A. The counter-revolutionary fervor of Marcos loyalists (Davide, 1990: 168);

B. Corruption and inefficiency in government (Davide, 1990: 170);

C. The volatility of the political situation brought about by the alarming power outages; water shortage; escalation of insurgency-related incidents; successive bombing incidents in Metro Manila; and the upcoming national and local elections (Davide, 1990: 167).

6. August 1987 Coup Attempt

On the early hours of August 28, 1987, more than 2,000 officers and men, spearheaded by then Colonel Gregorio Honasan and the RAM, simultaneously attacked various military and civilian objectives around the country, including the Malacañang Palace, in a coup attempt against the Aquino Administration.

While most of the targets (except Malacañang) were initially occupied by the rebels, the failure of subsequent reinforcements to arrive; and the lack of support from the private sector forced them to capitulate (Davide, 1990: 175-200).

The bloody end of the coup attempt came 36 hours later leaving 53 people dead and more than 200 wounded (Coronel, 1990: 83). Damage to property surpassed millions of pesos, including the burning of the General Headquarters building in Camp Aguinaldo (Davide, 1990: 200).

INTERNAL CAUSES:

A. Graft and corruption in the AFP (Coronel 1990: 52, 81);

B. Political patronage in the AFP promotions system (Coronel, 1990: 51; and Davide, 1990: 204);

C. Inept AFP leadership (Coronel, 1990: 52, 81);

D. Lack of logistical support for the officers and men in the field (Davide 1990: 204);

E. Low pay of AFP personnel (Coronel, 1990: 51, 80; Davide, 1990: 204; and Miranda, 1987: 1);

F. The “soft-stance” of the Aquino Administration against the CPP-NPA (Coronel, 1990: 70; Davide, 1990: 205; and Miranda, 1987: 1);

G. The presence of leftists in the Aquino Cabinet (Coronel, 1990: 52, 70, 80; and Davide, 1990: 205).

EXTERNAL CAUSES:

A. Corruption and incompetence in government (Coronel, 1990: 51, 70, 81);

B. The political instability and social unrest brought about by the dim prospects of agrarian reform; the spate of bombings in Metro Manila; the 80-centavo increase in oil prices; the conduct of Welgang Bayan by militant labor groups and student organizations (Davide, 1990: 176);

C. The failure of the government to deliver basic services especially in the rural areas (Davide, 1990: 470, 532).

7. December 1989 Coup Attempt*

On November 29, 1989, a dozen men of the 14th Scout Ranger Company led by Captain Jaime Junio prematurely attacked and destroyed a military communications facility in Tagaytay City (Yabes, 1991: 166-168) in what is to be the unofficial start of the biggest and bloodiest coup attempt in Philippine history.

Starting in the early hours of December 1, almost 3,000 rebel forces led by at least seven generals, 21 full colonels and 441 other officers (Davide, 1990: 439-440) simultaneously attacked Villamor Air Base, Fort Bonifacio, Camp Aguinaldo, PTV-4, North and South Harbors, Sangley Point, and Mactan Air Base (MAB) in Cebu. The Manila Domestic, Legazpi and Bacolod Airports were also briefly occupied by the rebels with the intent of flying in reinforcements. By daybreak, rebel T-28 Tora-Tora planes bombed/strafed Malacanang Palace and Camp Crame (Davide, 1990: 260-369).

But soon after the rebel air assets were destroyed and more government reinforcements arrived in Metro Manila, the tide began to turn. On December 2, the rebel Scout Rangers were forced to seek refuge at the Makati Business District (MBD) while the rebel Marine forces decided to leave Villamor Air Base to proceed and capture Camp Aguinaldo. However, after several futile attempts to penetrate the camp’s defenses, the battered rebel Marine forces were forced to surrender on December 3 (Davide, 1990: 260- 369).

By December 3, the positions previously occupied by the rebel forces were retaken by government troops until only the MBD and MAB in Cebu remained in rebels’ hands. Eventually, the Scout Rangers in MBD agreed to “return to barracks” on December 7, while the rebel forces in MAB led by General Jose Comendador surrendered on December 9 (Davide, 1990: 284, 368).

In all, the coup attempt claimed the lives of 99 persons, of which 31 were from government side, 17 from the rebel forces, and 51 civilians. 570 persons were also wounded in the skirmishes (Davide, 1990: 376).

INTERNAL CAUSES:

A. Graft and corruption in the AFP (Coronel 1990: 52, 81; Davide, 1990: 470; and Guingona, 1989: 27);

B. Inept AFP leadership (Coronel, 1990: 52, 81);

C. Political patronage in the AFP promotions system (Davide, 1990: 470; and Coronel, 1990: 51, 56);

D. Lack of logistical support for the officers and men in the field (Davide 1990: 470);

E. Low pay of AFP personnel (Coronel, 1990: 51, 80; Davide, 1990: 470; and Miranda, 1987: 1);

F. The “soft-stance” of the Aquino Adminstration against the CPP-NPA (Coronel, 1990: 70; and Davide, 1990: 471);

G. The presence of leftists in the Aquino Cabinet (Coronel, 1990: 52, 70, 80; and Davide, 1990: 471).

EXTERNAL CAUSES:

A. Graft and corruption in government (Coronel, 1990: 53; Davide, 1990: 470; Guingona, 1989: 27; and Salonga, 1989: 71);

B. The failure of the government to deliver basic services especially in the rural areas (Coronel, 1990: 53; Davide, 1990: 470; and Salonga, 1989: 71);

C. Widespread poverty (Davide, 1990: 470);

D. Uneven treatment of human rights violations committed by the AFP and the CPP-NPA (Davide, 1990: 470);

E. Absence of good government (Coronel, 1990: 52; and Davide, 1990: 471);

F. Thefailureofthegovernmenttoeffectivelyaddresstheeconomicproblemsof the country (Davide, 1990: 471);

G. The lack of genuine reconciliation on the part of the government with the different sectors opposing it (Davide, 1990: 470);

H. The failing economy under the Aquino Administration as shown by the double-digit inflation; high interest rates; severe transport crisis; power failures; fuel price increases; inadequate infrastructure; etc. (UP, 1989);

I. Political instability (Davide, 1990: 221).

*Author’s Note: The Noble rebellion in Mindanao, which happened a few months later, is basically an extension of the 1989 coup attempt and, therefore, had the same internal and external causes.

8. January 2001 EDSA II Mutiny

On January 16, 2001, the members of the prosecution panel walked-out at the height of the impeachment trial of then President Joseph Estrada when they lost the Senate voting (11 to 10) to open the controversial “second envelope.” The prosecution had claimed that the said envelope contained vital pieces of evidence to link Pres Estrada to the charges of corruption.

This triggered massive protest actions along the EDSA-Ortigas area by civil society groups that eventually on January 19 forced then Chief of Staff General Angelo Reyes, along with the commanders of the three branches of service of the AFP, to withdraw their support from their Commander-in-Chief (Estrada) and bestow it on then Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. As a result, President Estrada was forced to abdicate the presidency on January 20.

EDSA II was the second successful military intervention in Philippine history.

INTERNAL CAUSES: None.

EXTERNAL CAUSES:

A. The political instability and economic uncertainty brought about by the charges of corruption against Pres Estrada (Symonds, 2001);

B. The perception that President Estrada has lost his mandate from the people (Billington, 2002) (This observation was attributed to then Commanding General of the Philippine Army, General Diomedio Villanueva PA);

C. The perceived economic difficulties if President Estrada remains in power (Symonds, 2001). (This statement was attributed to Philippine Stock Exchange governor Vivian Yuchengco);

D. The incompetence of Pres Estrada to govern (Sheridan, 2001).

9. July 2003 Oakwood Incident

On the early morning of July 27, 2003, more than 300 officers and men of the AFP occupied the Oakwood Hotel in Makati City to protest against the Arroyo Administration for massive corruption; selling of arms and ammunition to the enemies of the state; state-sponsored terrorist acts; and widespread poverty.

The siege lasted 22 hours and was peacefully resolved only after an agreement was reached where the government will spare all the participants (except 5 members) from prosecution in exchange for their “return to barracks.”

INTERNAL CAUSES (Taken directly from the Oakwood participants):

A. Graft and corruption in the AFP;

B. The selling of arms and ammunition by the AFP to the enemies of the state resulting in the never-ending war with the insurgents and secessionists at the cost of thousands of lives of civilians and AFP personnel;

C. The complicity of Secretary Reyes and General Diomedio Villanueva in the “escape” of Abu Sayyaf members through the military cordon during the so-called Lamitan Siege in June 2001;

D. The “revolving door” policy of choosing the AFP Chief of Staff, which resulted to having six unproductive Chiefs of Staff in the three years of the Arroyo Administration;

E. Political patronage or ‘bata-bata’ system in the promotions of senior military commanders (committed particularly by Secretary Angelo Reyes);

F. Incompetent AFP Commanders resulting in the lack of strategic direction of the AFP;

G. The incompetence and political motivation of then-Secretary of National Defense Angelo Reyes;

H. The incompetence and political motivation of then-ISAFP Chief General Victor Corpus;

I. Lack of logistical support for the officers and men in the field;

J. The issuance of arms and ammunition by AFP commanders to politicians;

K. The turnover of captured MILF camps back to the MILF;

L. The abuse and misappropriation of AFP resources by its commanders;

M. The misuse of the AFP by politicians against the interests of the people;

N. The bankruptcy of RSBS;

O. Very poor medical and health services;

P. Low pay of AFP personnel;

Q. Lack of housing facilities for AFP personnel;

R. Lacking or deteriorating military equipment;

S. The increase of the number of generals, which will further reduce the

resources at the front lines.

EXTERNAL CAUSES (Taken directly from the Oakwood participants):

A. Graft and corruption in government;

B. State-sponsored terrorism as detailed in the paper entitled “The Greenbase Exposé” (Trillanes, 2003);

C. The failure of the Arroyo Administration to deliver the promises made at EDSA II;

D. Widespread poverty;

E. The failing economy as manifested by the runaway budget deficit, rising level of unemployment, falling value of the peso, and the rising costs of commodities.

RECAPITULATION:

ANALYSIS

From the table above, we can see that the most common internal cause of military interventions is the corruption in the AFP, which was raised five times. While, four causes were tied at four each and these are: inept AFP leaders; political patronage in promotions; lack of logistical support to the men in the field; and low pay.

The perceived soft-stance of the Aquino Administration towards the CPP-NPA and the perceived presence of leftists in the Aquino Cabinet, were also raised five times, and while they were applicable only to the Aquino regime, this should highlight the aversion of the AFP to ‘weak’ and left-leaning leadership.

As for the external causes, we can see that among those that ran high with the participants were: political instability (8 times); corruption in government (7 times); and economic instability (7 times). Other, common causes were: failure of the incumbent administration to deliver basic social services to the people (4 times); incompetent leaders in the administration (3 times); and widespread poverty (3 times).

We should take note that the high frequency of political and economic instability indicate that these may actually be precipitating factors or the opportune moments to launch a military intervention and not necessarily underlying factors themselves.

Another observation is that of all the interventions, only the January 2001 EDSA II was launched for purely external causes.

In all, our country has so far experienced nine major military interventions. Of these, seven failed and only two succeeded (EDSA I and II). All were incidentally launched with at least a similar motive of ‘national interest’ at a time when there is political instability and/or economic uncertainty. It is also a fact that while all the failed military interventions were destructive to the country, the successful ones, though not really constructive either, were welcomed and accepted by the general public and the international community.

The successes of EDSA I and II are very significant. These defined the bounds within which military intervention is necessary, justified and acceptable as a means to replace an administration. Specifically, if an administration: (1) resorts to electoral fraud (as in the case of EDSA I); or (2) is generally perceived as corrupt (as in the case of EDSA II).

Even then candidate for President Ramon Magsaysay planned for a coup should he be cheated by President Elpidio Quirino (de Quiros, 1990: 27), apparently justifying a military intervention of the integrity of the essence of democracy—the elections—was tampered with. De Quiros further wrote: “Equally importantly, Magsaysay’s contemplated coup in particular offered a theoretical pillar for ‘interventionist politics’: extra-constitutional methods were justifiable by the need to extirpate a corrupt government (de Quiros, 1990: 27).”

OTHER THEORIES ON THE CAUSE OF MILITARY INTERVENTIONS

1. Politicization of the AFP

Outside of those cited above as causes of military interventions, many theorize that the politicization of the AFP due to the expanded roles given during Martial Law is the root cause (Davide, 1990: 60; de Quiros, 1990: 48; Feliciano, 2003: 132; and Miranda, 1987: 1).

“But if this were so,” asked an Oakwood participant, “then why was it that only a small fraction of the military participated in interventions when the whole AFP had been exposed to the same politicization/socialization processes?” Moreover, all of those who participated in the Oakwood Incident grew up in their careers in an AFP that has reverted to its traditional roles and none had been part of the so-called “Martial Law AFP.” These arguments somehow make this theory passé and invalid.

Assuming that this theory were true, a “depoliticized” AFP may not necessarily be what is good for our society. For in the hands of a tyrannical president, this “obedient” AFP would also ensure a perpetual and oppressive rule. Should this be the case, a civilian uprising is most likely to happen.

A clear illustration of this scenario is the AFP during the Martial Law years. Contrary to the premise of this theory, the AFP during that time was not politicized even though it was given direct political power. It was precisely because of its professionalism, which in the definition of Professor Carolina Hernandez is the ”respect for the chain of command” (Davide, 1990: 13), and the “pro-constitution” stand of the AFP then that President Marcos was able to perpetuate his rule. This blind loyalty to the chain of command made possible the execution of covert illegal operations (e.g. illegal arrests, coercions, tortures and summary executions) under the pretext of national security, even if it was patent that these were against the interests of the people they were supposed to protect.

2. The Contagion Theory

According to Davide: “The ‘contagion’ theory states that a successful coup breeds other coups, either in the same government or in neighboring states. From the definition, it is obvious that the coup may occur either at the inter-governmental or the intra- military levels” (Davide, 1990: 19-20).

In a way, this theory partly explains why the soldiers who went to Oakwood Incident firmly believed that what they were doing was right. Apparently, they were comparing their actions to those made by General Reyes and company. But this is how far the theory goes since it cannot possibly be used in the formulation of alternatives because the successes of EDSA I and II are historical precedents, which we cannot change or erase. At the same time, we cannot be fatalistic and just fully submit to the theory’s proposition that a successful coup will breed other coups or military interventions.

ASSESSMENT/OUTCOME OF PAST AND PRESENT EFFORTS TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM

There were three significant policies implemented by the previous administrations to address military interventions: (1) The Davide Commission recommendations; (2) General Amnesty for the offenders; and (3) salary increase for AFP personnel. The present policies, on the other hand, are the recommendations put forth by the Feliciano Fact-Finding Commission (FFFC).

THE DAVIDE COMMISSION

In the aftermath of the failed coup of December 1989, President Aquino issued Administrative Order No 146 creating a Presidential Commission to conduct a fact- finding investigation of the 1989 rebellion. Its members were Hilario G. Davide Jr. as Chairman; Carolina G. Hernandez, Ricardo J. Romulo, Delfin L. Lazaro, and Christian S. Monsod, as members (Davide, 1990: preface).

On January 3, 1990, Congress approved R.A. 6832 entitled: “An Act Creating a Commission To Conduct a Thorough Fact-finding Investigation of the Failed Coup D’Etat of December 1989, Recommend Measures To Prevent The Occurrence Of Similar Attempts At A Violent Seizure Of Power, And For Other Purposes.” It was signed into law by Pres Aquino on January 5, 1990, and took effect on January 12, 1990 (Davide 1990: preface).

After several months of research, collation of testimonies, discussions, and analyses, the Davide Commission, as it was eventually called, came up with its final report.

The following are its recommendations (Davide, 1990: 510-530):

A. “Damage Control” and Short-Term Prescriptions to Address the Immediate Problem of Preventing Another Coup Attempt

1) Administering a justice and rehabilitation program to military participants

2) The strengthening of security measures on those under detention, especially where there may be sympathetic guards, i.e. Muntinlupa

3) The intensification of efforts to capture key renegade soldiers with a special unit of trusted officers directly responsible to the CSAFP

4) A reinvestigation of the “God Save The Queen” plot and prosecution of all those implicated in it

5) A review of the subsequent actuations of those involved in the Manila Hotel Incident, both military and civilian, who pledged never to engage in similar adventurism again, if spared from prosecution

6) An intensive follow-up investigation by government police agencies and the Justice Department of civilians implicated in the December 1989 attempt

7) Speedy action on appeals over decisions of AFP courts martial

8) The early passage of a comprehensive law on the establishment of the National Police

9) The immediate implementation of a comprehensive program to provide timely rescue and medical assistance to troops wounded in combat

10) A review by the military of its decision to disband the Scout Ranger Regiment

11) An immediate audit of the value formation program of the military and, with the help of civilian experts, the formulation of an intensive program (essentially constructive indoctrination), and the training of field commanders to carry it out

12) The immediate removal or reassignment of officers of less than 100% percent loyalty from sensitive positions in the military hierarchy, i.e. intelligence, operations, logistics, and training functions

13) The immediate disbandment of GCFI and all other organizations not authorized by the military

14) The observation of a systematic selection process for the new Chief of Staff that generates the least controversy about the choice

15) Just as in the civilian government, a crackdown by the military on some “big fish” corrupt officers

16) An immediate stop to unfair and/or humiliating treatment and criticism of military officers by Congress and other public officials, especially those before the Commission on Appointments

17) Speedy and firm disciplinary action and/or prosecution against members of the military involved in human rights violations as well as of civilian law enforcement personnel involved in victimizing military personnel

18) The purchase or charter by Congress of its own transportation facilities and a prohibition on their use of military equipment and aircraft

19) The expansion of the government’s public information program, which has considerably and commendably improved since December 1989, with more participation by local government officials

20) The provision of sufficient resources and support to the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military

B. An Agenda for the Remaining Twenty-One Months of the Aquino Administration

1) On the part of the Executive Department, a review of key policies and programs in the light of results, an acceptance of shortcomings where these exist, and a performance review of appointive officials

2) On the part of the President, a categorical declaration of her position with respect to the issue of re-election

3) On the part of the President, the immediate convening of the National Security Council and an initiative to invite all political parties to enter into a compact, to which people’s organizations and citizen groups would also subscribe, to defend and preserve our democracy, abjure the use of force and violence to effect change, commit to the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections in 1992, and arrive at solutions to our national problems through an honest and open debate of issues and programs

4) On the part of the political opposition, a positive response to the call for a united front against unconstitutional means to change the government and for upholding democratic processes

5) On the part of the Legislative Department and the President, the establishment of a special full-time commission to implement a post-insurgency program for the military that will modernize, professionalize, and bring it within the mainstream of national life

6) On the part of the Legislative Department, the immediate enactment of laws to ensure the democratization of the electoral process and the validity and public acceptance of its results, with particular reference to the critical 1992 synchronized election

7) The supremacy of civilian authority over the military should be established by the appointment, as soon as practicable, of civilians with the capability, integrity and leadership to head the Department of National Defense (DND), the National Security Council (NSC), and the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA). The NICA should have its own intelligence capability that can complement as well as validate military intelligence information

8) The institutionalization of necessary improvements in the military in the areas of promotion and assignments, purchasing and auditing, educational benefits abroad, and compulsory attendance at military command schools

9) The President and the Commission on Appointments must work out a system by which recommendations for promotions can be categorized in practice to avoid the exploitation of the confirmation process for political purposes

10) If justice is going to be a living principle of governance, the budgets of the Judiciary and the Department of Justice (DOJ) must be increased in order to upgrade the physical facilities, recording, investigative and prosecutive capability, and staffing of the system

11) The business sector, as the engine of growth of the economy, is the key sector, in addition to the government, in avoiding a severe economic crisis that could invite military adventurism. This is the time to stake its resources for democracy as the only political system under which it can survive and thrive, and thereby help others overcome their poverty

12) The non-governmental and people’s organizations are intermediating institutions, which can help unify a factionalized society. By mobilizing communities and resources to improve the lives of the poor, they help the grassroots create a stake in democracy.

13) The church occupies a unique position in Philippine society, acting as an arbiter on moral issues even in the realm of politics, i.e. the condemnation of the election fraud by the Marcos administration in February 1986, although inhibited by the constitutional mandate of separation church and state, the boundaries of which may shift from time to time.

14) The resolution of the dilemma faced by the media in crisis reporting lies more in the media itself rather than government regulations

C. Recommendations Over the Long-Term

1) Love of Country as the Highest Value

2) Social Justice. The full implementation of the social justice provisions of the Constitution

3) Citizen Army. The full implementation of the citizen army concept and the designated role of a small, modernized and professional military in a democratic society

4) Decentralization. The decentralization of the national government as a precondition for the efficient delivery of government services

5) The Constitution. After an appropriate period, to give the present Constitution an opportunity to be tested, formal consultations should be conducted at the grassroots on the desirability of constitutional amendments and of the specific proposals advanced by the different sectors. The people must be prepared to make amendments if it is clear that the fundamental law has proven to be irrelevant or inapplicable to the times.

6) Choosing Democracy. If a coup d’etat starts in the minds of men, then it is the collective will of a unified people that can prevent and overcome it. The people must choose democracy.

ASSESSMENT:

The Davide Commission, in its investigations, captured the true causes of past military interventions. It is also very comprehensive in its study of the origins of the AFP, and even the phenomenon of the coup d’ etat. Furthermore, the Commission was very detailed in its narrative of the previous military interventions.

Impressive as it is, the Davide Commission, however, was not clear in its methodology as to how it arrived at its 40 recommendations. As a result, when matched with the actual causes the Commission itself extracted from the 1989 coup participants, it came up with unresponsive recommendations. There were also some recommendations that were virtually impossible for any government agency to implement.

A possible explanation to this is that Chairman Davide and the other Commissioners, while they conducted an extensive research into the causes of past military interventions, already had their own biases on how these interventions should be handled, and these were clearly reflected on their recommendations. The only alternative to this explanation is the fact that the Commissioners were not trained as policy analysts and thus, failed to identify more responsive recommendations.

OUTCOME:

The failure to come up with more responsive propositions to address the underlying causes of the problem is the main flaw of the Davide Commission. As a result, since 1990 or the year it came out with its final report, there had been two major military interventions, EDSA II and the Oakwood Incident. Hence, in terms of effectiveness in preventing military interventions, the Davide Commission recommendations failed.

GENERAL AMNESTY

McCoy wrote: “After his inauguration in July, President Ramos established the National Unification Commission (NUC) to negotiate the surrender of all rebel forces— Muslim, communist, and military” (McCoy, 1999: 303). By July 1993, Unification Commissioner Haydee Yorac recommended an absolute and unconditional amnesty to all military rebels (McCoy, 1999: 304). Finally on March 1994, President Ramos issued an amnesty for all rebels (McCoy, 1999: 314). This was subsequently approved by Congress on the following year.

ASSESSMENT/OUTCOME:

While this policy was not directly responsive in addressing any of the causes cited above, it may have released the air of hostility between the Ramos Administration and the RAM. In this regard, this policy succeeded since no military intervention occurred during the Ramos Administration. Although, it did not prevent the occurrence of EDSA II and the Oakwood Incident, almost all of those granted amnesty such as the members of the RAM and the Marcos loyalists never involved themselves again with the succeeding military interventions. Hence, in terms of pacifying or convincing the participants to return to mainstream society, it was a success. But, in terms of effectiveness to prevent interventions in the long term, this policy, however, was still a failure.

The possible reason for its failure in the long term is that a policy of amnesty will only promote peace with a specific generation of offenders. However, if the underlying causes of the offense are not addressed, then it is but a matter of time when a new generation would arise and pursue the same causes raised by those before them.

SALARY INCREASE OF AFP PERSONNEL

In the aftermath of the 1989 coup attempt, Davide wrote “in Congress, bills were rushed to grant pay increases to soldiers. Across-the-board salary increases for the whole AFP were unprecedentedly granted (106% for a Master Sergeant, to 36% for a General)” (Davide, 1990: 200). After that move, there had been three more pay increases to soldiers, of these; two were initiated by President Ramos, and one was initiated by President Estrada, which was signed into law last 2001 (R.A. # 9166). This was fully implemented in January 2004.

ASSESSMENT/OUTCOME:

According to the Oakwood participants, any significant salary increase will always be a boost on the morale of the AFP rank and file and would also send a clear message that the Administration is looking out for their well-being. Being so, it could definitely help dissuade soldiers from being recruited.

To illustrate, from the time President Aquino made the “unprecendented” salary increase up until before the Oakwood Incident, the issue about salary was never brought up by the AFP personnel. For this matter, the policy was responsive and had a semblance of success.

On the other hand, this policy failed to prevent EDSA II mainly because, as cited above, there were no internal causes raised at EDSA II; while, the Oakwood Incident occurred not because it failed as a policy but because the other causes could have weighed considerably more than the issue of salary.

Just the same, the salary problem was raised by the Oakwood participants because the soldiers did not significantly feel the latest increase. The reason being, R.A. # 9166 was implemented on a piecemeal basis spread over three years after the signing into law and therefore, negating whatever morale-boosting effect it had intended when it was crafted.

FELICIANO FACT-FINDING COMMISSION (FFFC)

1. Rationale

As a response to the Oakwood Incident, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo created the FFFC, through Administrative Order # 78 (Feliciano, 2003: Annex B), on 30 July 2003. According to the said AO, the FFFC was tasked to “evaluate all the facts and circumstances surrounding the rebellion, its roots, and the provocations that inspired it, and submit its findings and recommendations to the President.”

In the furtherance of this mandate, the FFFC, in Rule 2, Section 1 of its own Resolution No. 001, defined their objectives as follows (Feliciano, 2003: Annex C):

A. To make a thorough investigation of all the facts and circumstances surrounding the failed rebellion or failed coup d’etat of 27 July 2003, its root causes and provocations, and

B. To recommend measures to prevent similar occurrences.

2. Assessment: On the findings of the FFFC as regards the true causes/provocations of

the Oakwood incident

According to its findings, the following were the root causes/provocations of the Oakwood Incident (Feliciano, 2003: 132-135):

A. The politicization of the military amid the erosion of civilian political institutions that had oversight powers over the military, particularly during and since the imposition of martial law, is a cause of military adventurism. The AFP’s role as a partner in national development efforts led them to assume roles that used to be played by civilian authorities.

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B. Failure on the part of the government to enforce the law deprives the law of its power to deter, particularly among those who had engaged in previous coup plots against the government but who were granted unconditional amnesty in 1995 without prior punishment

C. The key role of the AFP in the campaigns against communist insurgency and Moro secessionism creates civilian government dependence upon the military. In addition to the clearing of areas of insurgents and defending such cleared areas, soldiers are required to discharge the tasks of consolidation and development that properly belong to civilian authorities. Not only is the military’s political power enhanced, but their politicization is also thereby increased as they confront the problems of these communities on a prolonged basis.

D. Enlistment by civilian persons, including politicians, of military support for their personal and political ambitions contributes to military politicization and adventurism. Former President Marcos (and not the AFP) initiated the enlargement of the role of the military during his incumbency, particularly during Martial Law. Civilian persons, including politicians, also sought and encouraged the military breakaway of February 1986 and January 2001, giving thereby the AFP great political leverage over the civilian leaders who appear to rely on the military for political survival. When adequately motivated, military adventurers could exploit this situation to destabilize and overthrow the government.

E. At the same time, officers and troops under diligent and respected commanding officers did not join in the 27 July mutiny, suggesting the critical role played by this breed of military leaders in dealing with the coup virus.

F. Grievances about graft and corruption in the military, such as the RSBS, the Modernization Fund, and the procurement system provide a fertile ground for the recruitment of officers and men for military intervention and even overthrow of government. The expression of grievances resonates to the wider polity who share these sentiments, even as they do not approve of the means used and the solution proffered by the Magdalo group.

G. The Commission believes that the discovery or disclosure of the plot led the rebels to prematurely to launch ‘Oplan Andres,’ a plot larger than the Oakwood incident. Failure to attain the force requirements of Plans Alpha and Bravo compelled the rebels to launch Plan Charlie.

H. Moreover, members of PMA ’94 and ’95 were ‘frustrated’ when the dialogue about their concerns they expected would take place during the dinner hosted by the President on 23 July, did not take place. PMA ’94 and ’95 had the opportunity to talk to (Gen) Abaya at the ‘White House’. They talked about their class being unjustly linked to a plot against the government as well as about their commitment to fight graft and corruption ever since their graduation from the Academy. When the dinner with the President arranged for 23 July did not include a dialogue about their concerns, the invitees went down ‘frustrated.’

I. Finally, the order by the President aired on national television for the arrest of the coup leaders as ‘rogue soldiers’ was a precipitating factor behind the Oakwood Incident. At the time of the President’s order, the leaders of the plot were already missing from their respective units.

ASSESSMENT:

As we compare the root causes/provocations listed by the FFFC with those enumerated by the actual participants of the Oakwood Incident, we can see that only the complaint of graft and corruption in the AFP, matched. The only explanation to this is the fact that, according to the Oakwood participants, the FFFC never bothered to ask them as to what motivated them into going to Oakwood. Instead, the FFFC used the testimony of Ambassador Roy Cimatu to take note of some complaints raised during the negotiations. In addition, they also interviewed several dozens of officers who were not involved in Oakwood in the first place.

During its interviews with a few of the participants, what were asked by the FFFC were issues about ‘spontaneity’ and the costs of the ‘armbands.’ Even those complaints raised on national television and captured by the general public were perfunctorily brushed aside by the FFFC.

3. Assessment: On the FFFC recommendations

The following are the FFFC recommendations (Feliciano, 2003: 135-147):

A. Due diligence by commanding officers – Commanding officers in the field need constantly to warn their men against recruitment for destabilization plots against the government by adventurers in the military. Former military rebels who have turned their back on military adventurism could be used to conduct regular dialogues within the AFP for this purpose. The adoption of a program of this nature should go a long way towards neutralizing the coup virus.

B. Effectively address legitimate grievances – The government and the AFP need to address the legitimate grievances of the military against corrupt officers, officials, bureaucrats, and practices.

On the RSBS Problem

1) Liquidate the RSBS in an orderly manner

2) Return the soldiers’ contributions

3) Initiate an AFP Service and Insurance System

4) Implement fully the recommendations of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee

On the AFP Procurement System: Conversion and Other Problems

1) Simplify the AFP procurement procedures

2) Control commanders’ discretionary powers over the Centrally-Managed Funds 3) Reduce the amount of CMF in GHQ/service HQ hands

4) Strictly implement control measures over supplies

5) Set tenure limits for AFP finance and procurement officers

6) Establish an autonomous Internal Affairs Office (IAO)

On the AFP Modernization: Funding and Consequential Problems

1) Vigorously pursue recovery of the JUSMAG and NOVAI properties

2) Pursue recovery of the “squatted” land in Fort Bonifacio

3) Substantially increase AFP’s share in Fort Bonifacio’s sale proceeds

4) Reinforce Office of the Ombudsman by increasing funding and other support

On the State of the AFP Medical Services

1) PartofthefundingoftheAFPModernizationProgramgeneratedfromthesaleof Fort Bonifacio land should be dedicated to the modernization and upgrading of medical services, in accordance with the original statutory intent.

2) Consolidation of existing hospitals into fewer units could probably provide better medical services.

3) The suggestion that doctors be hired as doctors and compensated according to their level of expertise and experience and not according to rank, probably merits consideration and trial and validation.

4) A government counterpart to the premium paid by soldiers to PHILHEALTH insurance should enhance the benefits, which the military can receive.

5) Dedication of more efforts and funds to the improvement of the AFP medical services

On the Problem of Benefits for Soldiers Killed in Action

1) Strengthening of the record system of the personal data of soldiers and their dependents

2) Computerized information systems to provide accurate and updated data

On the Inadequacies of AFP Housing for Officers and Enlisted Personnel

1) TheAFPbudgetshouldprovideforincreasedallocationoffundsfortheAFPOn- Base Housing Program as well as its Off-Base Housing Program.

2) The“overstaying”ofretiredmilitarypersonnelinAFPhousingshouldbestopped and rectified

3) Thenumberofprivatelyownedquartersinallmilitarybasesshouldbereduced,if not totally eliminated.

4) Strictimplementationofexistingcriteriafortheawardingofgovernmentquarters to officers and enlisted personnel in the active service must be ensured.

C. A civilian Secretary of National Defense – This Commission reiterates the recommendation of the Davide Commission to have a civilian appointed to the position of Secretary of National Defense (SND). Beyond the need to institutionalize civilian authority over the military, the appointment of persons who have not had long and deep ties to the military, and who have not held positions in the military establishment that itself needs to be reformed, is essential if a reform program is to succeed. Although military officers acquire a civilian status upon retirement, they are likely to bring the rigidity of hierarchy, seniority, camaraderie, and other aspects of the military culture into the office of the SND that would obstruct reform.

D. Return NICA to its original mandate – Likewise, echoing the Davide Commission recommendation, this Commission recommends the appointment of a civilian head for the NICA. Moreover, NICA should be returned to its original mandate, that is, to coordinate all intelligence agencies, military and otherwise. The President must have a source of intelligence additional to the ISAFP. This should provide the Commander-in- Chief (C-in-C) with a parallel intelligence source in the event that information gathered by the ISAFP is not made fully available to the C-in-C, for any reason whatsoever.

E. Enforce the law against all violators – Erring officers, troops and civilian partners in coup plots must be treated in accordance with law to control and reverse the culture of impunity. As already noted, former rebel soldiers that were punished for their participation in the coups of the 1980s tended to have abandoned military adventurism. To remedy the recurrence of ‘negotiation in mutual ignorance’ of applicable laws, this gap must be addressed in officer education and training.

F. Observe or respect the military’s political neutrality – Civilian political leaders must restrain themselves from enlisting military support for their personal and political agenda as this can only further politicize the military and grievously endanger the constitutional system. This is a theme that should constantly be recalled to politicians and political parties.

G. Provide ‘negotiators’ with clear terms of reference – Government ‘negotiators’ in similar incidents should be given clear terms of reference by the authorities to avoid misperceptions that could promote another coup plot in the future. In this regard, strict adherence to the law as recommended in (E) above need not deter rebel soldiers from ‘negotiating’ with government. In a ‘negotiation’ of a similar nature, it is incumbent on the government ‘negotiators’ to demonstrate to and persuade the other side that it is to their common interest to ‘negotiate’. The law itself embodies the basic principle that punishment must be tailored to the degree of participation in the offense to be penalized.

H. Create an office under the Office of the President to oversee the implementation of the recommendations of the Commission (Feliciano, 2003: 146)

ASSESSMENT:

Since the FFFC failed to extract the true causes of the incident as shown above, it is not expected to propose the right solutions. True enough, according to the Oakwood participants, most of the FFFC recommendations were unresponsive in addressing the causes raised in the Oakwood Incident.

Still, the FFFC came up with some detailed propositions (for the problems on RSBS, Procurement System, and the AFP housing) that seemed sensible and could be adopted. Also, the proposition to create an office under the

Office of the President to oversee the implementation of policies could still be pursued.

It seems that both the Davide and the Feliciano Fact-Finding Commissions are reflective of the “research-based” executive policy making process in our country. Every time a serious crisis occurs, the knee-jerk reaction by the President is to form a fact- finding body to evaluate the facts, determine the cause, make necessary recommendations, and, if necessary, form a narrative of events. Usually, the nucleus of this body is composed of lawyers or retired justices. But the problem arises when the recommendations made by these fact-finding bodies are adopted automatically as national policies. This is not to undermine the competence of the members, but the recommendations made by fact-finding bodies are only meant to be starting points of further policy researches or definitive studies for the formulation of policy alternatives and should not be mistaken for the policy itself. These policy researches should only be conducted by qualified/trained policy analysts.

4. Probable Outcome

The failure to come up with more responsive propositions to address the underlying causes could be the main flaw of the present efforts to solve the problem. With this, it is expected that the problems will further deteriorate and in a matter of time, a new group may likely launch another military intervention to the detriment or the possible demise of the administration it will be launched against. In short, based on the assessment above, the FFFC recommendations will fail to prevent the recurrence of military interventions in the future.

DESCRIPTION OF OTHER ALTERNATIVES

Guided by the criterion of responsiveness, utilizing tools for identifying alternatives (e.g. literature review, development of typologies, passive collection and classification, etc.), and incorporating previous propositions assessed to be responsive or useful, the following alternatives were formulated:

ALTERNATIVES TO ADDRESS THE INTERNAL CAUSES

1. Eradicate corruption in the AFP

Based on the data gathered, corruption in the AFP is the main cause of at least five military interventions; thus, its eradication is a must in any alternative that aims to prevent interventions in the future. More than the direct losses of the government in terms of resources, corruption breeds a culture that countervails the nobility of the military profession.

Eradicating corruption will greatly increase the level of professionalism in the AFP. Moreover, this will release the resources to where they are supposed to be spent (e.g. acquisition/upgrade of equipment, logistics support in field operations, intelligence collection, capital outlay, off-base/on-base housing, improvement of medical services, etc.).

The problem of corruption in the AFP is very complicated. It comes in various forms and occurs in all areas of operations and all levels of the organization (Trillanes, 2001: 15). For this reason, it is difficult to prescribe a panacea for its eradication. Hence, it merits a separate policy research in itself.

2. Rehabilitate the Retirement Separation Benefit System (RSBS)

The bankruptcy of the RSBS is also a major source of morale problems in the rank and file of the AFP. A retiring soldier deserves nothing less than a peaceful and comfortable life after devoting three decades to the service of his country, often at the expense of a normal family life. To be deprived or delayed of the receipt of retirement benefits due him is simply unforgivable to the ordinary soldier.

Like corruption however, the problem of the RSBS is complicated. Hence, a separate policy research is required to flesh out the problem and provide the appropriate solutions. The propositions made by the FFFC regarding the RSBS problem could be adopted for this purpose.

3. Strictly apply meritocracy in the AFP promotions system

Two of the major causes of military interventions are the predominance of inept officers in the AFP leadership, and the prevailing political patronage in the AFP promotions system. One way to extirpate these is the strict application of meritocracy.

It works this way: The foremost trait in the military organization is leadership. According to what is being inculcated to cadets in the Philippine Military Academy, “Leadership is the art of influencing men in order to accomplish the mission.” From this definition, we can deduce that leadership is a skill, which sadly, not all of those in the AFP possess.

In the AFP however, there is a way to determine who has the necessary leadership qualities for higher command, this is called “service reputation.” It is incorporated in the AFP promotions system and is based on the subject officer’s reputation reflected by his unit/ individual performances as well as previous work relations with superiors, peers, and subordinates. Next to seniority, it should precede the other criteria in the system such as: geographical assignments, awards, schooling, billet assignments, etc. In other words, through seniority, we can determine who are the candidates for promotion whereas through “service reputation” and the other criteria, we can determine who among these candidates deserve to be promoted or not.

The problem arises when a ”patron” meddles with the system and pushes for the promotion of a protégé, a relative or a friend, ahead of those who deserve it. In time, this practice bred a culture of political patronage where the officers who know how the system works, consciously seek patrons to ensure their promotion.

Eventually, it politicized the whole system or what is referred to in the AFP as “militics,” This affects the morale of the rank and file, as the good officers get by-passed by the inept ones who have “connections.” This also results in the loss of respect for the undeserving senior officers. In due course, most of the important positions in the AFP are filled up by this kind of inept/politically indebted officers.

4. Uplift the standard of living of the AFP personnel

If the morale were high among the men not only would it be difficult for anyone to recruit them for any military intervention, but it would also increase their enthusiasm in going about their work. Although morale cannot be quantified, to the lowly soldier it simply translates to: rest and recreation (R & R) to spend time with the family, and money to spend for the family. The common denominator in both is the family. R & R is not much of a problem since this can be given periodically by the unit commander. But often, this is not availed of by the soldiers since even the transportation expenses to go home, is also a problem. So, if the government can only provide additional benefits to the soldiers for their families, as enumerated below, then the morale of the soldier would be greatly boosted.

It is conceded that there would be financial constraints in the implementation of these particular propositions but after stressing enough the extreme importance of the success of the overall policy, these propositions should be financially supported.

A. Salary increase or giving of non-monetary benefits

The issue of salary figured as one of the major internal causes in some of the past military interventions; therefore, raising the salary of AFP personnel would be directly addressing this cause. Although apparently, this was not one of their driving motivations; still, the salaries given to the officers and enlisted personnel of the AFP are clearly not commensurate to the service they are giving to their country and this, definitely, affects their morale.

An alternative to a salary increase is giving of additional non-monetary benefits such as: tax reductions/exemptions, reduction of RSBS contributions, rice subsidy, C-130 flights or ship passes for soldiers going on R & R, etc.

B. Improvement of medical and health services

It is acknowledged that the general state of medical and health services in the country is pathetic. But for a soldier to escape death in the battlefield but die inside a military hospital because of lack of supplies, equipment or worse, because of incompetence — is truly a catastrophe that spreads quickly within the ranks.

A marked improvement in the medical and health services will greatly impress upon the soldiers that the administration is concerned for their well-being, and this will be gladly reciprocated through a more enthusiastic, selfless service to the country.

C. Mass housing

It is a known fact that most of the AFP personnel are homeless. Some are even squatting in areas near bases where they are assigned. So, providing every soldier his own home will definitely be a big morale-booster.

There are huge tracts of land located in military reservations across the country that can easily address this problem. In addition, the FFFC recommendations as regards AFP housing can still be pursued.

5. Streamline the AFP bureaucracy

Most of the meager budget of the AFP is used up by the maintenance costs of having a bloated bureaucracy. This hinders the flow of funds to the front lines or operating units where they are needed. As a result, soldiers assigned to the field units who experience difficulties in actual combat operations due to shortages in logistics get demoralized when they get to visit the administrative offices where resources are lavishly spent or given out.

This problem was exacerbated by the recent signing of R.A. 9188, increasing the number of generals in the AFP. This meant additional administrative offices and therefore, additional demands for resources.

The following are some of the proposed activities of the streamlining:

A. Consolidation of offices/units with redundant/overlapping functions

B. Dissolution of resource-heavy but unproductive offices/units

C. Reduction of generals in the AFP Table of Organization

D. Dissolution of the General Headquarters (GHQ) and the adoption of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concept

The realization of the above is expected to free up the necessary resources that is being consumed by the top-heavy AFP bureaucracy. These resources in turn, can now be channeled to the operational units where they are most needed, and also to fund morale and welfare programs as cited in number 4 above.

6. Create a cabinet-level agency (e.g. The Presidential Adviser on Military Affairs) directly under the Office of the President.

An office with a direct access to the President, similar to what was recommended by the FFFC, will ensure the proper implementation of the proposed reforms. It should have oversight powers and clear inter-department relationships with all concerned to prevent overlapping functions. This office will also conduct the appropriate policy researches to further flesh out the more complicated problems enumerated and other internal causes not raised by this paper.

ALTERNATIVE TO ADDRESS THE EXTERNAL CAUSES

Practice good governance.

Good governance, according to Kinuthia-Njenga, is “perceived as a common good that cuts across many segments of the development scene” (Kinuthia-Njenga, 1999). The World Bank defines it as the “manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development” (Kinuthia- Njenga, 1999). According to the UNDP: “Its dimensions are the rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, participation, equity, effectiveness and efficiency, accountability, and strategic vision” (UNDP, 1999).

Furthermore, good governance ensures that all policies or decisions emanating from an incumbent administration will be for the best interest of the country or the majority of the people.

With these definitions of good governance, all the major external causes namely: corruption, failure to deliver basic services, state-sponsored terrorism, poverty, and political and economic instability; are covered. Hence, only the practice of good governance will effectively address them.

Indeed, according to an Ateneo de Manila University paper: “The quality of civilian governance is the variable essential to its survival and sustainability. There is simply no substitute for good, effective and responsive political and economic performance” (AdMU, 2001). Likewise, according to Dr. Wilfredo Villacorta, “the best way to prevent the recurrence of a coup is to institute fundamental reforms that will bring justice and progress in society” (Villacorta, 1989: 54).

POLITICAL FEASIBILITY:

For good governance to be tested for political feasibility is paradoxical. Ideally, it should be politically feasible for it is the essence of government itself — to serve the people and to serve them well. However, given the state of political affairs and the bureaucracy in our country today, good governance had been reduced to nothing but a political slogan.

First to resist this is the oligarchic elite, who will defy anything that will threaten its hold over the country’s riches. Next, are the politicians who, like the oligarchy, are deeply entrenched in the status quo where they enjoy vast powers and resources at the expense of the people who voted for them. Another sector that would resist good governance is the corruption-ridden bureaucracy.

The only answer to this collective resistance is for the President to have moral integrity and political will. Moral integrity is the guarantee that there will always be “purity of intent” in every policy made. While, political will is the assurance that such a policy will be implemented. Armed with these two, good governance can be ensured.

Then again, any President, who will say that the practice of good governance is not politically feasible, does not deserve to rule this country.

CONCLUSION

Military interventions greatly affect our country’s economic and political stability, and international image. More than these, lives are often caught in the crossfire. Simply put, we cannot afford another one.

Military interventions are set off by underlying causes within the organization, government and society in general; hence, the only way to prevent its occurrence is to address these underlying causes. But based on the assessment made above, most of the present policies, as stated through the Feliciano Fact-Finding Commission recommendations, are not responsive to the underlying causes of the Oakwood Incident and therefore, implementing the FFFC recommendations alone will not prevent future military interventions.

On the other hand, other possible alternatives enumerated above directly addressed the underlying causes and therefore, may have better chances of success. But crucial to their proper implementation is the demand for unbending political will and moral integrity from no less than the President.

In view of this conclusion, the following are hereby recommended:

1. Pursue the implementation of the following FFFC recommendations, which were found to be responsive or useful:

A. Creation of a cabinet-level agency (e.g. The Presidential Adviser on Military Affairs) directly under the Office of the President. It should have oversight powers and clear inter-department relationships with all concerned to prevent over-lapping of functions. This office will also conduct the appropriate policy researches to further flesh out the more complicated problems enumerated below as well as other internal causes not raised by this paper;

B. The propositions regarding the RSBS, Procurement System, AFP Modernization, AFP Medical Services, and AFP Housing.

2. Review the other FFFC recommendations as to their responsiveness to the causes of military interventions.

3. Conduct policy researches on the following:

A. Eradication of corruption in the AFP;

B. Rehabilitation of RSBS;

C. Strict application of meritocracy in the AFP promotions system;

D. Uplifting of the standard of living of the AFP personnel through:

1) Salary increase or non-monetary benefits such as, tax reductions/exemptions, reduction of RSBS contributions, rice subsidy, C-130 flights or ship passes for soldiers going on R & R, etc.;

2) Improvement of medical and health services;

3) Mass housing.

E. Streamlining the AFP bureaucracy.

4. Practice good governance to address the external causes of military intervention.

These propositions, extensive as they may seem, do not preclude any military intervention that may occur later on due to reasons outside of those analyzed. For example, one that is motivated by religious fanaticism. While this or any other reason may be unlikely at the moment, it should be noted nonetheless.

Finally, the responsibility for the success or failure of the overall policy to prevent military interventions rests solely on the President. As emphasized, the consequences of failure are severe. For this reason alone, it is incumbent upon him to ensure that nothing hinders its successful implementation.

REFERENCES

Billington, Michael

2002 “Truth is out on Ramos’ Coups in Philippines”. Executive Intelligence Review. May 31, 2002. downloaded from www.larouchepub.com.

Coronel, Shiela S.

1990 “RAM: From reform to revolution” in Kudeta: The Challenge to Philippine Democracy. Manila: PCIJ, 1990.

Corpus, Victor N.

1989 Silent War. Quezon City: VNC Enterprises, 1989.

Davide, Hilario Jr. G. et. al.

1990 The Final Report of the Fact-Finding Commission (pursuant to R.A. No. 6832). Makati: Bookmark Inc., October 1990

De Quiros, Conrado

1990 “Sword over the throne” in Kudeta: the Challenge to Philippine Democracy. Manila: PCIJ, 1990.

Doronilla, Armando

2003 “Insights from the Oakwood mutiny.” Philippine Daily Inquirer. July 30, 2003.

Escalante, Salvador and J. Augustus Y. De La Paz

2000 The Five Percent Revolution. EDSA in Retrospect: A Deconstruction. Quezon City: Katotohanan At Katarungan Foundation Inc., April 2000. Feliciano, Florentino P. et. al.

2003 THE REPORT OF THE FACT FINDING COMMISSION. October 17, 2003

Guingona, Teofisto

1989 As quoted in “Reflections on the December 1989 Coup D’ Etat”. Manila: Senate, 1989.

Kinuthia-Njenga, Cecilia

1999 “Good Governance: Common Definitions”. Habitat, 1999. downloadedfrom www.unhabitat.org.

McCoy, Alfred W.

1999 Closer Than Brothers: Manhood at the Philippine Military Academy. Manila: Anvil Publishing, 1999.

Miranda, Felipe B.

1987 “The August 28, 1987 Coup: Public Perceptions in a Time of Continuing Crisis”. Quezon City: Social Weather Stations, 1987.

Patton, Carl V. and David S. Sawicki

1993 Basic Methods of Policy Analysis and Planning 2nd Edition. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1993.

Salonga, Jovito

1989 As quoted in “Reflections on the December 1989 Coup D’ Etat”. Manila: Senate, 1989.

Sheridan, Greg

2001 As quoted in Symonds, Peter “Philippine military and big business join hands to oust Estrada”. January 31, 2001, downloaded from www.wsws.org.

Symonds, Peter

2001 “Tense standoff in the Philippines after Estrada impeachment trial comes to a halt”. January 19, 2001, downloaded from www.wsws.org. 

Trillanes, Antonio IV F.

2003 “The Greenbase Expose”. Quezon City: UP, October 2003.

2001 “A Study of Corruption in the Philippine Navy”. Quezon City: UP, October 2001.

Villacorta, Wilfredo

1989 As quoted in “Reflections on the December 1989 Coup D’ Etat”. Manila: Senate, 1989.

Yabes, Criselda

1991 The Boys from the Barracks: The Philippine Military after EDSA. Pasig, MM: Anvil Pub., 1991.

1987 The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. Mandaluyong City: National Book Store, 1987.

1989 “A Call to Action”. School of Economics, University of the Philippines. Diliman, Quezon City, December 8, 1989.

1999 Human Development Report. UNDP, 1999. downloaded from www.undp- pogar.org

2001 “Understanding Military Intervention in Politics”. Department of Political Science, School of Social Sciences, Ateneo de Manila University. 2001. downloaded from www.focusweb.org

2003 Republic Act no. 9188 “An Act Strengthening the Professionalism in the Armed Forces of the Philippines by Increasing the Percentage Distribution of Generals/Flag Officers in the AFP Table of Organization, Amending for this Purpose Republic Act Numbered Eighty-One Eighty-Six (R.A. 8186) and for Other Purposes”. Metro Manila: Congress of the Philippines, February 10, 2003.

2003 Editorial “Fallout”. Philippine Daily Inquirer. July 31, 2003.

2003 PDI Business Staff “Analysts say economy set back by 1 1⁄2 years”. Philippine Daily Inquirer. July 28, 2003.

The pursuit of this noble vision would tread on a long, circuitous and difficult path and thus, would require structural changes to some institutional restrictions that have been hindering our progress and development.

The dire situation we are in calls for drastic, sweeping reforms and there is no way around it. Political concessions and accommodations will never solve our problems. Therefore, the decisions must be hard and steadfast.

The NRP does not pretend to be a panacea for our country’s problems. Instead, its primary objective is to arrest the rapid spiraling descent of our Republic and lay the foundation for a truly strong Nation. More importantly, it intends to ignite a moral and cultural revolution to finally free us from the clutches of greed, indolence, subservience, ignorance and helplessness that have been ingrained on our psyche through centuries of colonial persecution.

The NRP is a strategic package of policy propositions, which focuses on five key result areas of governance. These are: Peace and Order, Economy, Poverty, Corruption, and Population.

PEACE and ORDER

The peace and order problem is the main stumbling block to our country’s progress. We cannot develop as a nation as long as lawlessness is prevalent in our society. Economic gains, if any, will be negated and domestic/foreign investments and tourists will be discouraged to come in. Worse, the atmosphere of crime and terror has prevented our citizens from enjoying the blessings of freedom and democracy.

To address the problem more effectively, Peace and Order is dissected into five areas of concern namely: foreign aggression, terrorism, criminality, insurgency, and secessionism. Each area is completely diverse with the other and, therefore, each requires a unique strategy for its resolution.

A. Diplomatic solutions to deal with Foreign Aggression

The contested claims for Sabah, Spratly Island Group and the Scarborough Shoals are, at the moment, the potential flashpoints, which could trigger a conflict with other countries. If ever, these would be settled diplomatically by invoking international laws. As an added measure, bilateral ties with concerned countries would be strengthened. This would be a much more peaceful and inexpensive option than engaging in an arms race.

B. War vs. Terrorism

Terrorism is a global concern. We have seen it rear its ugly head many times over, mercilessly killing innocent lives in the guise of pursuing fanatical beliefs or ideology. It must be stopped and the responsibility for its extermination falls not only on the State but on each member of society. This would be achieved through vigilance, relentless exchange of information, and highly responsive law enforcement agencies.

C. Campaign against Crime

Criminality is a menace to society. The past decades saw the rapid increase in crime incidence threatening business, tourism and, more importantly, the normal lives of ordinary Filipinos. While it is true that poverty is one root cause of crime, many rich and powerful people also commit these dastardly acts. Either way, there should be nothing to stop the State from protecting the other helpless members of society and applying justice to these criminals.

To effectively deal with criminality however, the other legs of the criminal justice system such as law enforcement, prosecution, the judiciary, and rehabilitation, would have to be reformed.

The following anti-crime measures would be undertaken:

• Reformation of the Philippine National Police (to be discussed below). This would ensure that
• our laws would be strictly and properly enforced.
• Conduct of entrapment operations directed to corrupt prosecutors/members of the Judiciary
• Cleansing of the Judiciary. The Supreme Court would be urged to cleanse their ranks of
• hoodlums in robes. All pending cases due for decision should be resolved within six months otherwise they would face impeachment (i.e. culpable violation of Sec. 16 of Art III of the Constitution) or direct ouster by the people. The people have ‘legitimately’ done this to an elected President before. Thus, following this line it could also be legitimately done to the Supreme Court. The Judiciary is just as responsible for the present mess in our criminal justice system as the others.
• Reformation of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology. Any incidence of prisoner escape would mean outright relief/discharge for the jail warden and other responsible personnel. The BJMP facilities would also be improved to enhance the rehabilitation process for prisoners.
• Filing of an anti-crime bill that would, among others, establish a National Identification System
• Promotion of vigilance in society

*It should be stressed that in addressing criminality, HUMAN RIGHTS WOULD BE

RESPECTED AT ALL TIMES.

D. Ending the Insurgency

The CPP-NPA insurgency has been around for more than 30 years. However, the end of the Cold War in the ‘90s had effectively removed the ideological causes for its armed struggle. Still, its demands for social equity and social justice are valid causes that should be dealt with squarely by the State.

To end the insurgency, the following activities would be undertaken:

• Reopening of peace talks with local communist leaders. This would directly tackle the
• demands of local insurgents so that regional peace could be achieved immediately.
• Rural infrastructure development. The construction of roads, school buildings, health care
• facilities, and mass housing in far-flung barangays can promote social equity.
• Delivery of basic social services. Medical and Dental missions, socio-civic operations and Minimum Basic Needs (MBN) activities would be conducted in far-flung barangays including
• NPA mass bases.
• Agricultural modernization. Rural employment and economic growth would discourage the
• rural folk from joining the insurgency.
• Agrarian reform. This would greatly address the problem of social inequity.
• Establishment of the Barangay Intelligence Network. This would enable the National Government (NG) to be abreast of the prevailing social, economic and security conditions in all barangays nationwide.

E. Lasting Peace in Mindanao

The handling of Muslim secessionist groups is much more complicated considering that it has historical, religious, social, economic, cultural, political and military dimensions. Therefore, the strategy to be employed would likewise require a multi-dimensional approach. On the historical and religious facets of the problem, the Muslims and Christians would be made to understand that they are equally essential parts of a composite National Identity that is Filipino. We are all Filipinos and to fight this reality is futile, and would only bring more bloodshed than it already has. All of us could be considered victims of history and we could argue and fight to the death and it would still not change our present predicaments. The best thing to do now is resolve our differences so that we could jointly move forward toward a progressive future for the succeeding generations.

The social, economic, cultural and political dimensions of the problem would be addressed through a truly autonomous government for each major Muslim group (e.g. Tausugs, Maranaos, Maguindanaons, etc.). The failure of the present ARMM is but a manifestation of how the diverse Muslim groups were completely misunderstood.

Finally, those who insist on pursuing secession through arms would leave the State no other choice but to deal with them militarily.

The Abu Sayyaf group, on the other hand, is considered a terrorist group and therefore, would have to be exterminated.

The following activities would be undertaken to finally bring lasting peace in Mindanao:

• Reopening of peace talks with MILF and other Muslim secessionist groups
• Establishment of Autonomous Muslim Regions for each major Muslim group accompanied by a viable “mini-Marshall Plan” for each. This would finally allow each Muslim Group to completely govern themselves free from any socio-cultural oppression.
• The filing of a bill calling for the institution of a National Identity to foster unity among all Filipinos regardless of social status, religion, ideology and culture
• Rural infrastructure development. The construction of roads, school buildings, health care facilities and mass housing in far-flung Muslim barangays to promote social equity. The AFP Engineering Brigades could be used for this purpose.

F. Reformation of the AFP/PNP

A key element in the resolution of the above concerns is the reformation of two major organizations primarily responsible for the upkeep of peace and order namely: the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP). Both institutions have been badly damaged and plundered by their treacherously corrupt and power-driven senior officers. While there may still be a few morally upright generals left in the AFP/PNP nonetheless, they have become so insignificant and impotent that they never made any difference.

For us to have any chance at restoring peace and order, these institutions must be reformed, cleansed and restructured.

In the AFP, the funds for modernization, intelligence, operations and maintenance were blatantly and methodically realigned straight to the generals’ pockets and lavish houses. All these were done while their men on the field, the lowly soldiers on foot patrol wearing dilapidated uniforms and using antiquated weapons, were risking their lives fiercely fighting for military victories, for which these same generals unashamedly took credit. These soldiers do not even have their own houses to come home to, as most of them are squatters inside military camps. To top it all, even their retirement pay was not spared as the RSBS was again pillaged by the same military leaders.

The situation in the PNP, as everyone would agree, is much worse. We have policemen engaging in murder, kidnap-for-ransom, robbery, drug trafficking, extortion, bribery and illegal gambling. In short, the very institution that was supposed to protect the welfare of the people is the same institution terrorizing them.

To reform the AFP/PNP, the following activities would be undertaken:

1. On Professionalization

• All officers with the rank of Brigadier General/Commodore/Chief Superintendent and up would have to retire. Should they refuse, they would be placed on floating status. This would give a new face to these organizations–the face of reform. Meritocracy would henceforth be the sole basis for the selection of the new AFP/PNP leaders.

• The tenure of Major Commanders would be fixed. The rapid turnover of officers occupying sensitive positions has resulted in the absence of institutional reforms. The senior officers often treat their present assignments as mere stepping stones for their next higher assignment. The tenure of every Chief of Staff would be fixed at three years. This would ensure that reforms could be implemented and institutionalized. However, an incumbent Chief of Staff may be relieved unceremoniously by the Commander-in-Chief for corruption, incompetence, negligence and other offenses. The following would be the fixed terms of other major commanders: Commanding General, Philippine Army, 3 years; Commanding General, Philippine Air Force, 3 years; Flag-Officer-In-Command, Philippine Navy, 3 years; Chief, PNP, 3 years; Commander, Area Commands, 3 years; Positions with rank of Major Gen/Radm, minimum of 2 years; Positions with rank of Brig Gen/Commo, minimum of 1 year.

• The number of generals would be reduced.

• Establishment of the Inspector General Service and the Judge Advocate General Service asseparate branches of service under the direct operational control of the Commander-in-Chief. This would free the investigation, prosecution, and judicial arms of the AFP from the pressures of their superiors so that they can accomplish their mandated tasks with a dispassionate and unbiased perspective.

• The curricula of PMA/PNPA and other military and police training institutions would be revised to include modules focusing on leadership training, character development, patriotism and nationalism.

• Conduct of regular value formation and re-indoctrination activities to inculcate proper values into the hearts and minds AFP/PNP personnel.

2. On structural reforms

• The PNP would be reabsorbed by the AFP. The PNP’s character transformation to being civilian has worked disastrously against the interest of national security and public safety. The re-absorption to the AFP would allow PNP personnel to be subjected to military laws and save the organization from a total breakdown in discipline. Also, this would consolidate the major law enforcement agencies for better control and coordination during joint operations.

• Camp Crame would be dissolved and sold. The PNP headquarters would be relocated to Camp Aguinaldo.

• The AFP J-Staff would be abolished. In its place, a Joint Strategic Staff would be formed composed of the Commanders of the different branches of service and the Chief of Staff, who would be its Chairman. Its primary function is strategic command, control and planning for the entire AFP.

• The ISAFP would be under the direct operational control of the Chief-of-Staff.

• All arms and ammunition of the AFP/PNP, Government Arsenal and other manufacturers would be subjected to an inventory. A database would also be created to facilitate accounting. This would stop the continued pilferage of arms and ammo, which are either sold to the enemies of the State or used in criminal operations.

3. On Morale and Welfare

• Salaries of AFP personnel would be standardized to match their PNP counterparts.

• AFP/PNP personnel in combat areas would receive a combat pay equivalent to 25 percent of their base pay.

• Mass housing for all AFP/PNP personnel would be prioritized. This would be situated in the vast military reservations nationwide.

• The RSBS would be overhauled to ensure that the retirement pay of all AFP personnel would be guaranteed.

• Improvement of medical facilities and health services for the AFP/PNP personnel and dependents

• Increase of the subsistence allowance to at least P100 per day

4. On Operations and Modernization

• Thrust on Internal Security Operations (ISO). All manpower and resources of the AFP/PNP would be focused on the resolution of internal peace and order problems.

• Assist in nation-building. AFP Engineering Brigades would be used extensively in the rural infrastructure efforts of the NG. All other AFP/PNP units would increase their conduct of Medical/Dental missions and Civic-Action operations.

• The AFP Modernization Program would be reviewed. Basic requirements for ISO as encapsulated in the Shoot-Move-Communicate-Force protection concept would be satisfied first before embarking on more ambitious projects.

• Intensification of intelligence operations directed against the enemies of the State to include the establishment of the Barangay Intelligence Network.

ECONOMY

According to 2002 reports, our GDP and GNP posted growths of 4.6 percent and 5.2 percent, respectively. While this may be true, the question is who benefited most from this growth? The poor? The working middle class? Or the upper class?

To better analyze the true state of our economy, we would put forth some hard facts, which were not given as much emphasis. The unemployment rate is over 10 percent. Investor confidence is very low and businesses are down. The Agriculture sector has contracted. And our total outstanding external debt as of September 2002 has surpassed $50 billion. To top it all, we have a runaway budget deficit reaching P200 billion that is threatening to halt government operations.

We need to reverse this economic downturn quickly before it totally collapses.

Below are the key economic reforms/activities to be undertaken for our immediate economic recovery:

A. On Fiscal Administration

Reformation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). (to be discussed below)

• The removal of the 32 percent income tax limit for high-income earners

• Strict enforcement of laws against tax evasion

• Initiation of the repeal of the Automatic Appropriations Law (AAL). This would effectively de-prioritize debt payments. However, the payments for government bonds issued as well as other domestic debts would still be guaranteed by the NG. Also, foreign lending institutions would be assured that debts owed to them would not be written off.

• NG to make representations to developmental banks such as World Bank and Asian Development Bank for immediate debt relief

• Eradication of bureaucratic corruption (to be discussed below)

• Crackdown on smuggling operations

• Implementation of the National Austerity Program. This would be applied to all national government agencies (NGA). The activities under this program would include the following:

1. All NG-funded foreign travel would be banned for at least three years. International conferences earlier committed to by the NG would be attended by the Vice-President and no more than five members of his staff. This alone could save at least P500 million annually for the NG and also enable the President to focus more on domestic concerns.
2.  The procurement of service vehicles for all NGAs would be banned. COA would be notified that any payments thereof should be disallowed including procurement circumventions such as ‘knock-down parts’ or substitution.
3. All Presidential Advisers and consultants would be removed.
4. NGAs/LGUs/GOCCs should have no more than two technical consultants each.
5. Salaries and allowances of all Presidential appointees on all GOCCs and other private corporations to which the NG has a stake on, would be standardized and should never exceed the salary of the President. To ensure compliance, a contract would be executed between the appointee and the NG prior to the former’s appointment stating, among others, that any form of remuneration given in excess of the amount of the salary of the President would be turned-in to the Bureau of Treasury immediately upon its receipt.
6. Expenditures for meetings, conferences, ceremonies, trips, Christmas parties, anniversary celebrations, etc., would be set at a minimum.
7. All NGAs and LGUs would practice fuel and electricity cost-reducing measures.
8. Ceremonial functions of the President would be reduced to a minimum.

In sum, the financial surplus expected to be generated through the increased revenue collection, eradication of corruption, crackdown on smuggling, bureaucratic streamlining, National Austerity Program and the repeal of the AAL, would be re-channeled to finance the rehabilitation and reinvigoration of the Agriculture and Industry sectors, infrastructure development as well as to support programs on education and anti-poverty thereby spurring sustainable and equitable economic growth and productivity.

B. On Globalization

Globalization as a paradigm originated from First World countries. Thus, it is highly probable that the economists who conceptualized it did not dwell on its possible negative effects on developing countries. More likely, their foremost concern was how to tap the huge but protected Third World markets to advance their own economic interests. They shrouded this scheme by preaching that Globalization would ultimately benefit consumers of all nations, as they would now have access to high quality, world-class products at the cheapest price.

However, the impact of Globalization on our country would be catastrophic. The infancy of our Agriculture and Industry sectors could not stand against global standards and would eventually collapse. This would result in the wholesale displacement of farmers and laborers across the country causing social unrest, anarchy and possibly, civil war. In short, in completely embracing globalization we would be risking the survival of our State only for the sake of consumer welfare.

Sadly, however, we are already members of the WTO and so are most countries in the world. Hence, any stand against globalization at this point has become untenable. Still, this should not stop the State from protecting its own interests.

The following activities would be undertaken to countervail the effects of Globalization:

• Review of WTO commitments
• NG to make representations to WTO to move the full implementation of WTO agreements for another ten years citing national security concerns
• Protection of the Agricultural sector through the re-imposition of Quantitative
• Restrictions/Tariff on imported agricultural products
• Reinvigoration, rehabilitation, and modernization of the Agricultural and Industrial sector through government subsidies.
• Removal of all tariff barriers on imported products and raw materials used extensively for local manufacturing
• Revisit the ‘Buy Filipino’ policy to help boost the local industries and help foster National Pride on our local products.
• Launch an aggressive marketing campaign for export products utilizing foreign service offices.
• Spearhead the forging of a coalition of Third World countries within WTO that would protect the interests of developing countries.

POVERTY

NSCB statistics for 2000 show that of the 15.3 million households in the Philippines, 33.7 percent fall below the poverty threshold, meaning 5.1 million families could not satisfy their basic needs. This was a 2.4 percentage increase from the poverty incidence in 1997. The poverty problem is also coupled with very minimal access to the basic social services offered by the NG, such as education, health services and shelter.

To alleviate poverty, the best strategy for the short and medium terms would be to generate employment and have at least one member of each family employed. However, the abject poor people in our society who are too sick, too old or too young for employment should receive help right away.

As a long-term solution to poverty, the free and easy access to formal education is still the best strategy.

The following activities would be undertaken to alleviate poverty:

• The budget for education would be at least doubled to ensure that the poor would always have free and easy access to formal education.
• The Minimum Basic Needs strategy would be retained but its implementation would now be directly supervised by the Office of the President to facilitate inter-department coordination and to better monitor compliance.
• Establishment of institutional homes for the aged, disabled, mentally sick and street children.
• Rural Development. Rural employment would be generated through labor-intensive infrastructure projects like farm-to-market roads, irrigation facilities, post-harvest facilities, mass housing, school buildings and health care institutions. This would be complemented with provisions for education, health care, electrification and access to potable water.
• Agriculturalization. The renewed thrust towards the protection and rehabilitation of the agricultural sector could provide the impetus for agricultural growth, employment generation and consequently, the eradication of rural poverty. In addition, this would stem the influx of rural poor to the urban areas. The urban poor may even be persuaded to seek opportunities in the rural areas. The Agricultural thrust would include:

a. The immediate implementation of the Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act

b. NG mediation for the immediate release of the frozen Coco levy funds to be used for the rehabilitation of the coconut industry

c. The break-up of cartels on agricultural products

d. Crackdown on smuggling of agricultural product

• Wealth distribution through Agrarian Reform.

a. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) would be given a one-year deadline to complete land distribution after which it would be reduced to a mere branch under the Department of Agriculture. The DAR budget would then be re-channeled to finance Agri- Agra loans.

b. Cooperatives would be promoted and enhanced as tools for the protection of the newly landed as well as to guide them in Agribusiness. These would also serve as conduits for the release of Agri-Agra loans.

c. The conversion of agricultural lands into residential or industrial lands would be banned.

CORRUPTION

Corruption is the bane of our country. Its roots could be traced way back during the colonial era and is now deeply imbedded in our bureaucracy, our culture and our society. Previous administrations have attempted to eradicate corruption through words or actions, only to find out the futility of it all.

But now, there is a way.

Corruption in itself is complex. Corrupt practices should not be lumped together as one form requiring one formula in eradicating it. Each government agency has, through the years, bred its own peculiar type of corruption. Applying conventional anti-corruption strategies of inserting additional checks and balances would only result in the formulation of new ways of circumvention. In the end, the net effect is only additional bureaucratic red tape for the public. Another failed strategy is creating a super Anti-Corruption agency, which has no inkling as to where the corruption occurs.

The participation of the private sector is also not the remedy as they are often party to the commission of corruption. The culture of corruption is as prevalent in the private sector as it is in government.

Corruption, based on where they occur, can be classified into two, Operational and Administrative.

A. Operational Corruption

Operational corruption is where the act occurs as a result or as part of an agency’s operational activity. An example of this is in the BIR wherein the common acts of corruption like bribery and extortion, occur during the conduct of its operational activity, that is tax collection. Corruption in other revenue collecting and regulating agencies such as Customs, COMELEC, LTO, LRA, etc., falls in this category. The PNP’s corrupt practices of kotong and hulidap also fall under operational corruption.

To effectively deal with this systemic problem, it would likewise require a systemic solution. In other words, the very same agency, which created its own form of corruption, would be the same agency to be used to decimate it. This would be done through performance audits. Performance targets with zero-corruption assumptions would first be set jointly by the agency concerned and the NG. This way, the NG would only need to monitor the performance as compared to the targets to measure the agency’s success or failure in its anti-corruption drive. Agency heads who fail to reach the imposed targets would be relieved immediately. This would force the agency head to apply the same standard to his subordinates, until a cycle of top-to-bottom reforms has been completed in that particular agency.

The following tasks would be undertaken to address operational corruption:

• Reformation of BIR and BOC

a. All Commissioners/Deputy Commissioners as well as all the District Collectors of BOC and all the Regional and District Officers of BIR would be immediately relieved. This would give a fresh start to these organizations. Meritocracy would be the sole basis for the selection of the new set of revenue officers and collectors.

b. New annual revenue collection targets would be set for both BIR and BOC. All revenue officers and collectors who reach these targets would receive incentives. But those who fail to reach the targets would be relieved. This would again spark a top-to-bottom cleansing of their agencies since the pressure of trying to reach the targets would force the regional/district heads to set certain targets to their subordinates and subject them to the same performance audit standards.

c. Tax audit of individuals and corporations

d. Computerization of BIR and BOC

• Reformation of other NGAs engaged in operational corruption using the same strategy as stated above
• Computerization of COMELEC and other revenue collecting/regulating agencies

B. Administrative Corruption

Administrative corruption is a different type altogether. It is where the corrupt act occurs as a result or as part of an agency’s performance of an administrative function. This includes procurement of supplies, equipment and personnel, hiring of services, facilitation of contracts, processing of documents, etc.

To illustrate, one of the administrative tasks of the Philippine Army (PA) is to procure ammunition. Let us assume that according to procurement documents, the PA procured 100,000 rounds of ammunition in the amount of P2 million. Everything in the said documents were in order and had the corresponding signatures and receipts; therefore, the payment was allowed by COA. In truth however, not a single ammunition was delivered. Instead, P1.4 million in cash was given to the Commanding General, PA. The other P600,000 was distributed equitably as profits for the supplier and as “lagay” for COA and other significant signatories who facilitated the transaction. This form of administrative corruption is called ‘conversion’ or ‘ghost delivery.’ How could this happen? Collusion. All persons involved in the procurement process were either involved in the pay-off or were forced to sign for fear of their superiors. As for the COA, he/she receives 1-2 percent equivalent of the total amount indicated in the purchase order to allow the payment for the transaction.

To guard against this type of corruption, the reformation of the Commission on Audit is key. Under the present system, the COA is the primary instrument of the State in guarding against administrative corruption. Since the government is concededly immersed in corruption, one simple conclusion can be borne out, that is, theCOA has failed miserably in effectively performing its mandate. Worse, it had often been an accomplice to the bureaucratic corruption it was supposed to guard against.

The following are the reasons why some COA auditors have a propensity for such negative bureaucratic behavior: (1) threats/pressure from the heads of NGAs/LGU’, (2) boundary exchange or familiarity with officials/offices being audited, and (3) simple greed.

The following activities would be undertaken to address administrative corruption:

• The immediate implementation of the Procurement Reform Act
• The cleansing of all NGA/LGU employee rosters to weed out ‘ghost’ employees
• Restructuring of COA auditing procedures

a. Transfer of all tenant COA offices to the Regional Offices. Post-auditing would be done at the security of their own regional offices so as to insulate them from external pressure and prevent boundary exchange.

b. NGA’s documents for auditing that are within the jurisdiction of a Regional COA office would be raffled off to COA auditors to maintain randomness and avoid collusion and bribery during post-audit.

c. Monthly random inspection of supply bodegas of all NGAs by COA auditors to ensure that the actual inventory reconciles with the quantities stated in the inventory reports. This would do away with such corrupt practices as conversion/ghost delivery and substitution.

POPULATION

In 2002, the Philippines placed third among Southeast Asian countries with the most number of people. The population now stands at more than 80 million people, with a growth rate of 2.3 percent. At this rate, the population is projected to reach 100 million by 2015.

The country’s rapid population growth has negative effects on economic growth, delivery of basic social services, environment, and is one of the primary causes of poverty. To address this problem, there would have to be a shift in the population policy from one that promotes only natural methods of birth control to one that promotes both natural and artificial means of birth control. It should be stressed however, that ABORTION WOULD STILL BE ILLEGAL and would never be condoned.

The following population control measures would be undertaken:

• Declaration of a national policy to control population through natural or artificial means with an emphasis on the need to avert population explosion
• Distribution of free or affordable artificial contraceptive devices to all health centers nationwide
• Information campaign on population management subjects such as responsible parenthood, family planning, reproductive health, and proper use of contraceptives
• Inclusion of value formation activities in the curricula of Secondary or Tertiary levels of education
• Church-State Dichotomy. The separation of Church and State is guaranteed by the Constitution. Hence, it is the role of the State to apply whatever strategy it could effectively use to address a particular crisis. In this case, in dealing with the population problem, the strategy to be employed by the State is to make artificial contraceptive devices accessible to the people and allow them to freely choose the appropriate birth control method that is suitable for them. The role of the Church on the other hand, is to influence its own flock whether or not to use such devices instead of interfering directly with State policies.

While some sectors glorified this ‘miraculous’ occurrence, certain dynamics of the people power phenomenon now have become embedded in the policy process that it threatens the very nature of the process itself. In this light, the Philippines public policy process is, indeed, a very complex, yet interesting object of study. As it would have been ideal to cover both the legislative and executive policy processes, this paper focuses only on the latter with the GMAAdministration as the context of the study.

To better analyze the policy process, the Stages Heuristic framework or the Stages Approach (Jones, 1970; Anderson, 1975; Brewer and De Leon, 1983)will be used. The stages involved are: (1) agenda setting; (2) policy formulation;(3) legitimation; (4) implementation; and (5) evaluation.

The crisis was triggered by the berating of the Marines by RAdm Wong for alleged irregularities in the procurement of P3.8 million worth of KevlarHelmets (Pablo, 2001). In the events that followed, the Marines prevailed and RAdm Wong was stripped of his command and was ‘promoted’ to an ambassadorial post.

The crisis, while it was eventually resolved peacefully, exposed a previously unseen face of the Navy—the face of CORRUPTION.

On 26 May 2001, Abu Sayyaf bandits kidnapped 20 persons from Dos Palmas, an upscale resort in Palawan. The next day, a joint task force was formed to conduct pursuit operations (PDI, 27 May 2001). On 28 May, a reconnaissance plane spotted the kidnappers’ group aboard three boats approaching the Mapun Island Group (MIG)(PDI, 28 May 2001). Immediately, four navy patrol crafts were dispatched to conduct a naval blockade on the island. Then finally on 31 May, Abu Sayyaf spokesman Abu Sabaya claimed that they have slipped through the naval blockade and are now in Sulu and Basilan (PDI, 31 May 2001). Presidential Spokesperson Rigoberto Tiglao quickly forgave the Navy for its ineffectiveness when he said: “the gunmen’s boats had top speeds of 40 knots, way beyond the capability of the Philippine Navy. Using that type of craft they would have eaten up the wide expanse of Sulu Sea between Palawan and Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi (Mapun) in five hours” (PDI, 28 May 2001). Tiglao further stressed: “The biggest problem really is the Philippine Navy has few patrol boats. There are plans to increase the number of these patrol boats” (PDI, 28 May 2001). These statements coming from the presidential spokesperson clearly signified three things: First, the cluelessness of the Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) Administration regarding the true situation on the ground and its total reliance on sanitized information given by the AFP leadership; Second, its ignorance of the capabilities of its navy; Lastly, the GMA Administration’s penchant for tolerating grossly incompetent acts of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, in this case the Navy, due to her political indebtedness to it for being primarily responsible for installing her as President of the Republic.

The kidnappers actually used motor launches (lancha) that run a measly 12 knots as seen by the Air Force reconnaissance plane and reported to the Western Command. This probably explains why the kidnappers reportedly took two days (and not five hours as Tiglao said) to travel from Dos Palmas to MIG. Besides, the kumpit (fast motor boats used by smugglers in the South), while it is true that it can run up to 40 knots (without load), it is never used for prolonged sorties as it easily runs out of fuel. Its reported fuel consumption is approximately 500 liters per hour at the speed of 40 knots. For it to traverse Dos Palmas to Mapun and eventually to Basilan, they would need space for at least 10 drums of fuel aside from the space that the kidnappers and hostages would occupy. For a sleek boat, which measures no more than 60 feet, this is impossible unless they had a convoy of at least five kumpits, which is totally unheard of, and costs around P25 million.

The four navy patrol crafts should have successfully blockaded MIG, which only has a land area of approximately 30 square nautical miles (n.mi.), had they been deployed correctly. Each craft has a navigational/surface search radar that has an effective scanning radius of six n.mi.. This means that if properly positioned, the four patrol crafts’ radar sweeps should have overlapped at least at the middle, thus covering the whole MIG up to three n.mi. off the coastlines. However, as it happened the Task Group Commander in charge of the blockade, relying heavily on intelligence reports, positioned all four crafts 1 n.mi. off Tandatao Point of Mapun mainland at 500-yard intervals, thus minimizing their surface search capabilities. The Naval Special Warfare Group team that landed in the area supposedly to rescue the hostages, found out that indeed one of the boats used was anchored near Tandatao Point, but the kidnappers’ group was either in Pamelikan Island or Binlut Island, the northern islands of MIG andboth were way beyond radar range from where the crafts were positioned thus, enabling the group to slip off to Basilan.

The escape of the Abu Sayyaf through the naval blockade was one tactical blunder that caused great humiliation and enormous costs to the country. To be simply ignored and forgiven by the President (through Tiglao’s statement) was a display of weakness as a Commander-in-Chief of the AFP. But the President could not have been that stupid and weak, as this gesture had showed. Thus, it is rather safe to conclude that, as mentioned earlier, it was her political indebtedness and fear of the AFP that prevented her from imposing sanctions lest she suffers the same fate as former President Joseph Estrada through another ‘withdrawal of support’ by the AFP. These unfortunate political concessions, first demonstrated in the case of Rear Admiral Guillermo G. Wong AFP during the Philippine Navy leadership crisis that occurred in February 2001 (to be discussed later in this paper), while it would favor certain officers, could further deteriorate the Navy, and the AFP.

While it would seem that the incident cited above has dwelt more on incompetence and ineffectiveness, this paper will show that this is just one manifestation of the ill effects of corruption in the Navy. More specifically, how corruption made this incident even possible in the first place.

Through the years, the Navy top brass have always raised the issues of obsolescence and shortage of operating assets of the fleet to cover for the Navy’s ineffectiveness. But is this really the case? Or, is it simply caused by an institutionalized corruption that exists in all levels and in all areas of the organization? If so, then what is the cost? How could this problem be solved? These are the questions that this paper intends to answer.

In going about the discussion, a brief look at the history of the Navy will be necessary to appreciate its importance and relevance to the country. Other basic facts about the organization will also be laid down to provide the necessary backdrop to the main subject of the paper.

THE PHILIPPINE NAVY

THE PAST

The Insurgent Navy

The Philippine Navy traces its roots way back to the Philippine Revolution against Spain with the handover by the Americans of a captured Spanish steam pinnace to General Emilio Aguinaldo on 20 May 1898. The vessel was renamed Magdalo and emerged as the first watercraft of the navy. Soon, several other merchant ships donated by patriots were added to form a nascent fleet. The Insurgent Navy was instrumental to the revolutionary cause through its conduct of basic naval operations, such as troop deployments and arms shipments. The first successful amphibious assault against a Spanish garrison was even spearheaded by the Magdalo at Bacoor Bay on 26 May 1898. Its effectiveness went on throughout the Filipino-American War. However, after the capture of President Aguinaldo on 23 March 1901, the insurgent navy disintegrated. (Zulueta, 1998: 20)

The Off-Shore Patrol

The Navy was reborn with the creation of the Off-Shore Patrol (OSP) on 14 April 1938. A few patrol crafts and three high-speed torpedo boats, also known as Q-boats, were the pioneers of this force. They were intended to form part of a nucleus of 55 Q- boats that would repel enemy amphibious landings as General Douglas McArthur had envisioned. But before the acquisition of more Q-boats, war had broken out. As a consequence, the OSP was relegated to other roles such as, troop insertions, intelligence operations, and ferry missions. Though they had a few skirmishes with Japanese Navy ships and warplanes, after the fall of Bataan on 8 April 1942, all ships of the OSP had to be scuttled. (Giagonia, 1997: 147)

The Post-War Navy

After World War II, the country had a surplus of war materiel given by the US. Among these were 83 ships of various types. Thus, the OSP was reorganized and upgraded into the Philippine Naval Patrol, to become a major command of the AFP. On 23 December 1950, through E.O. 389, the Philippine Naval Patrol was renamed as the Philippine Navy. (Giagonia, 1997: 245)

For the next four decades, the Navy experienced a confluence of events and performed various roles in furtherance of national security interests and national development. In the 1950s, the significant roles were to conduct counter insurgency operations against the Hukbalahap and ferry missions during the Korean War. These were followed by the anti-smuggling and anti-piracy operations in Sulu, where the Navy was credited for destroying the network of illegal operations of the most notorious band of pirates and outlaws, including the dreaded Kamlon. The 1960s were highlighted by activities such as the ferry missions during the Vietnam War and by the bilateral and multilateral naval exercises that further strengthened the Navy’s maritime defense posture in the region. The anti-smuggling and anti-piracy operations in the south were also sustained during this era (Giagonia, 1997: 247-272). Throughout the 1970s until the early 1980s, the Navy reverted to its counter-insurgency mode, this time against two fronts, the Muslim secessionists and the communists (Zulueta, 1998: 44). During the 1986 EDSA Revolt, 85 percent of the Navy joined the rebels led by then-Minister of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile and then-AFP Vice-Chief of Staff and Philippine Constabulary Chief Fidel V. Ramos. ( Giagonia, 1997: 310)

According to Zulueta: “By the time things were simmering down to a semblance of peace quiet in the early 1990s, the American naval and air forces, stung by the Philippine Senate’s rejection of a treaty that would have prolonged their stay in the Philippines, were leaving in a huff. Suddenly, the Philippines saw its ‘surrogate’ navy and air force heading for the gates of Subic and Clark, leaving the resident highly anxious about its national defense.” (Zulueta, 1998: 46)

Commodore Jose Francisco, former Field Officer-in-Charge, commenting on the American withdrawal, aptly stated, “All throughout the years the Americans were here, we had the military assistance agreement with them and logistical support from them, and all that the government had to do was pay our salaries. What happened was that we had an indigestion. We knew it would not last, but when it did end, we were at a loss” (Zulueta, 1998: 46). Rightly so, among the benefits the Navy had when the US baseswere still around were: the US  Military Assistance Program (USMAP), the equipment hand-me-down program of the US; the Foreign Military Sales (FMS), part of the bases rental fees are channeled back to the AFP for the purchase of surplus US military hardware or ship repair packages; use of floating drydock and other facilities; foreign training programs and technical consultations; and the security blanket for external threats. (The latter could arguably be considered a benefit since it may be due to this dependence, the Philippine Navy never got to prepare to become an independent and credible navy by the time the Americans left.)

THE PRESENT

Mission

The Navy today has for its mission, “to conduct prompt and sustained naval operations in support of the AFP’s mission.” (NOQC Naval Orientation Reference Handguide, 1997).

Functions

1. Provide naval defense to ensure the sovereignty of the Philippines and to protect the people from external threats

2. Conduct naval operations in support of air and ground operations

3. Conduct maritime law enforcement within the territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)

4. Promote safety of life at sea and environment protection 5. Assist in national development efforts

Organization (see Annex A)

Resources

*Operational Readiness:

 Ships: 38.5%

 Aircraft: 42.8%

Capabilities

1. Limited Surface Warfare

2. Naval Gunfire Support

3. Amphibious Warfare

4. Sealift Operations

5. Domestic sea control

6. Search and Rescue

Present Role in Society

The traditional role of any navy is to obtain ‘sea control’ when necessary. Sea control is the ability of a fleet to control certain maritime areas (Mahan, 1885) for whatever purposes it may serve. It involves deployment of naval forces to engage, destroy or repel enemy naval forces, and carries with it the right to forbid passage through capture or destruction (Agudelo, 1994: 25). While the Navy can obtain sea control within our territorial waters, it cannot do so beyond it. This is due to the fact that our fleet could not match up to any of our neighbors’ navies. Thus, the Navy today cannot perform its primary mandated task to provide naval defense to ensure the sovereignty of the Philippines and protect the people from all external threats. With this, the role of the Navy has been relegated to conducting internal security operations and maritime law enforcement. But the Philippines, with its recognition as an archipelagic state where, according to Zulueta, “the islands, waters and other natural features form an intrinsic geographical, economic and political entity,” these roles seemed as paramount to the survival of the state as naval defense. (Zulueta, 1998: 14)

Internal Security Operations (ISO) involve naval gunfire support, amphibious and sealift operations. These are defined in an operations plan and are often conducted in conjunction with air and ground forces. For the past decades, the Navy had been very active in this role in support of counter-insurgency operations. On the other hand, Maritime Law Enforcement (MARLEN) is actually the primary role of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), which was separated from the Navy and transferred to the Department of Transportation and Communication in 1998. However, due to the PCG’s lack of surface assets and also due to the wide expanse of the Philippine waters that include the EEZ, the Navy was deputized by various government agencies to enforce their specific laws. MARLEN involves the conduct of active and passive patrols to achieve naval presence in areas were illegal activities are perceived to be rampant.

While it is a known fact that several Navy ships are of World War II vintage, most of the boats/crafts that conduct MARLEN operations are new and acquired only in the mid-‘90s. They are highly effective for coastal patrols being armed with 25 millimeter cannons and have maximum speeds of 30 knots.

FORMS AND LOCI OF CORRUPTION

CORRUPTION DEFINED

Corruption, according to Sosmena, is “defined as a dysfunctional and pathological act that negates the accomplishment of its constitutional mandate of promoting public interest” (Sosmena, 1999: 6). While according to Klitgaard, “it is the misuse of a public office for personal gain.” (Sosmena, 1999)

Corruption may be categorized in two ways: individualized or systemic (Carino, 1985: 15). Individualized corruption is where a person performs a secret moneymaking act in relation to his duties as public official or government employee. While systemic corruption is committed in an agency where, according to Caiden, “corruption has become so regularized and institutionalized that organizational supports back wrong- doing and actually penalizes those who live up to the old norms” (Caiden, 1977: 306). Carino says further, that it is “demonstrated when bureaucrats and clients can describe the same illegal process, including such details as bribery rates per service and the way these are shared among the members of the syndicate throughout the agency. Those with ‘initiative’ and ‘daring’ share the largesse with their colleagues with less opportunities, thus engulfing everyone in an administrative culture that tolerates, even idolizes, the fruits of corruption.” (Carino, 1985: 15)

LOCI OF CORRUPTION

The loci of corruption in the Navy are found in two distinct areas: operational activities, which are ship-based and administrative and support activities, which are shore-based. Ship-based activities include individual Navy ship activities and Naval Task Forces (NTF) directly involved in naval operations. Shore-based activities, meanwhile, include operations or functions of the various staff/support units such as personnel, intelligence, logistics, finance, training, etc. Under these are the various forms of corruption, which are not necessarily peculiar to each.

Ship-based Corruption

Direct Bribery – “Any public officer who shall agree to perform an act constituting a crime, in connection with the performance of his duties, in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present received by such officer, personally or through mediation of another….” (Art 210 of the Revised Penal Code 1987)

Case Illustration #1

On or about 1600H of 7 June 1995, while patrol ship PS1 was anchored off Sacol Island, Zamboanga while conducting a naval blockade against Abu Sayyaf Group reportedly hiding on the said island, a medium-sized lancha was sighted suspiciously steaming nearby. Upon sensing its possible hostile intentions, the crew of PS1 signaled it to come alongside. The lancha was then inspected and it yielded P11 million worth of smuggled goods. It was also reported that two Navy patrol crafts were sighted approaching the lancha but observed to have reversed their course when the lancha unintentionally went near PS1.

During interrogation aboard PS1, the master patron confessed that they were hired to transport the goods from Sandakan, Malaysia to a designated place near the coast of Zamboanga City. They were further instructed to rendezvous with Navy patrol crafts that will escort them to the drop-off point.

The lancha and its crew were then apprehended and its goods were confiscated.

* This special ‘escort’ arrangement is common to the small patrol crafts assigned in Naval Forces South. The personnel assigned in these crafts are particularly vulnerable to bribes since these are the workhorses of the fleet that conduct MARLEN patrols. The bribe package includes monthly rice and cash incentives for the crew, plus repair expenses for the craft. A utility boy, who also doubles as courier is also provided on behalf of the smuggler.

Case Illustration #2

In August 1999, a patrol gunboat (PG1) along with three other patrol crafts received a directive from NTF61 to conduct naval blockade/MARLEN patrols at designated areas in Sulu Sea, several n.miles off Jolo Island. Also contained in the directive was an intelligence report stating that there will be an attempt to smuggle in assorted firearms and explosives to the island that evening. PG1 and the other crafts then proceeded as ordered and vigilantly kept watch over their designated areas where the Muslim extremists were supposed to pass as stated in the directive. The following morning, the PN boats returned to port empty-handed. A few days later, the NTF61 operations officer invited fellow officers to a drinking spree. There he openly bragged that he just got a payoff amounting to P100,000 from a known big-time smuggler. The payoff was for letting the smugglers pass through a few nights ago without being apprehended, by ensuring that their sea-lanes were cleared of Navy patrol boats. He did so by directing all patrol boats to proceed to their designated areas away from these sea lanes.

*It is common knowledge for Naval intelligence operatives that only small-time smugglers would dare dash their way through the waters of the South. Their merchandise are often blue seal cigarettes, ukay-ukay or small quantities of lumber. However, most of them are armed with machine guns and sometimes have armed escorts. On the other hand, big-time smugglers, pirates and bandits (including the Abu Sayyaf) will never venture out into the Philippine waters unless they are given ‘clearance’ by the Navy, Customs and PNP personnel (the Navy mole in these transactions is usually the operations officer of the NTF). They would not risk losing their valuable merchandise, which include arms, explosives, drugs and other contraband, to a crusading Navy captain patrolling the high seas. Another given fact is that the bulk of the arms supply of the MILF are sea-borne. MILF Commanders use big- time smugglers as fronts to conduct their transshipment operations. This form of bribery is also common in the Quezon province where illegal logging is rampant, and in the Northern coasts of Luzon where all forms of smuggling are being conducted.

Extortion – a crime “committed by means of intimidation of persons, that is, by extorting money from a person. In cases where a law enforcer has apprehended a person committing a crime and the officer demands money from the culprit as the price for not arresting or prosecuting him, even if the latter is willing to give money, there is nevertheless some element of intimidation because of the threat of impending arrest or prosecution. (Aquino, 1987: 427)

Case Illustration #3

On or about 1900H of 14 May 1999, the Commanding Officer (CO) of a patrol gunboat (PG2) assigned in Davao, received an intelligence report stating that a known smuggler will attempt to smuggle contraband that evening to the southern coast of Davao. Immediately, PG2 was off to sea to conduct patrols to intercept the unknown craft. A few hours later, PG2 picked up a radar contact a few miles off their position. As the patrol gunboat approached, the crew noticed that boat was unlighted yet running at a steady speed, an obvious indication of smuggling activity. PG2 then overtook the suspected smuggling boat and conducted inspection. True enough, the boat yielded contraband worth at least P2 million. After the inspection, the patron was invited inside PG2 for interrogation. Present during the investigation were the CO, Executive Officer (EXO), Chief Master At Arms (CMAA), and the patron of the boat. Upon being seated in the wardroom, the CO said to the patron: “Didiretsohin na kita, magbigay ka ng P100,000 at pakakawalan kita.” The patron haggled for a while but eventually agreed. He went back to his boat and after a few minutes, returned to PG2. The patron gave a bag to the CO, who then counted the money inside. Satisfied with the transaction, the CO ordered the boat to be released. The CO then went inside his room with the bag in hand.

* This is a classic example of individualized corruption as defined by Dr. Carino. This is often done by the extreme scalawags of the Navy, which are not few.

Fraud Against Government (Pilferage) – “Any person subject to military law who steals, embezzles, knowingly and willfully misappropriates, applies to his own use or benefit, or wrongfully or knowingly sells or disposes of any ordnance, arms, equipment, ammunition, clothing, subsistence stores, money, or other property of the government furnished or intended for the military services thereof.” (Article of War Nr 95).

Case Illustration #4

In March 1995, the CO of a patrol gunboat PG3 received a directive from the Naval Task Force 71(NTF71) to conduct MARLEN patrol around the waters off Saranggani. The CO then re-provisioned and re-fueled to full tank capacity for the protracted mission. After refueling, PG3 left port. However, when they were already out at sea, instead of conducting MARLEN patrols as directed, the CO instructed the crew to moor their patrol boat to a payaw or fish marker. After securing their patrol boat to the payaw, the CO then ordered to shut off the engine. During this time, the CO was constantly reporting to NTF71 that his craft was continuously patrolling the designated area. After four days of being moored to the payaw, PG3 went back to port. The CO then reported the negative result of his patrol to the NTF71 Commander and then made a phone call to a contact. Early morning the next day, a motor launch went alongside PG3. After a few hours, the motor launch left but not after siphoning 10,000 liters of fuel saved by PG3 during the operation and paying the CO P60,000 as payment at P6/liter.

Shore-based Corruption

Malversation – “Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property….”(Art 217 Revised Penal Code 1987).

Case Illustration #6

In 1999, patrol gunboat PG4 underwent major repairs that had a budget cost of P50 million. While the vessel was drydocked in Navotas, the Executive Officer found out that the steel plates placed on the hull were below the specifications stated in the work order. He then reviewed the other areas of the work package and discovered that most of the spare parts being installed during the overhauling of the main engines were used ones coming from another gunboat of the same class that had been mothballed. Thus, when he computed the actual cost incurred by the contractor, the total repair package should have been only P5 million. The EXO then went to the Headquarters to complain about the repair irregularities and the grossly overpriced contract; he was surprised to find out that the repair had already been accepted by the Technical Inspection and Acceptance Committee six months earlier, which means that the contractor had already been paid even while the repair was still unfinished. Six months later, PG4 completely bogged down right after a send-off ceremony for deployment. It is now programmed for another major repair.

Case Illustration #7

On 22 December 1999 during the Command Christmas Party, the Commander of the Philippine Fleet distributed P450 each to all the personnel in his Command. For a total number of personnel at above 4,000, this would compute to roughly P2 million. Then on January 2000, the Patrol Force (a major unit of Philippine Fleet) prepared documents for the ‘ghost repair’ of an already operational patrol gunboat amounting to P3 million, apparently as payment for the cash advanced by a favored dealer during the said Christmas party.

* Case illustrations # 6 and 7 will show why only 38 percent of the total naval assets are operational. For the Navy top brass to say that the Navy has few patrol boats is of their own undoing. Had these funds for repair (almost P350 million in the present budget) been used properly all these years, there would have been more ships to patrol our waters. A patrol boat with a speed of 20 knots is capable of patrolling an area of almost 3,000 sq n.mi. in a 10-hour patrol. Several boats positioned properly, could project a Naval presence in the vast Philippine waters that would effectively deter outlaws.

Case Illustration #8

The Office of the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff for Personnel, O-N1, among other functions, is the staff in charge of personnel accounting. It listed the total number of active military personnel (officers and EP) at 19,714. This total excludes those assigned at the General Headquarters (GHQ). On the other hand, the Philippine Navy Finance Center (PNFC) is the unit in charge of providing the pay and allowances of personnel. In the PNFC list, the total number of personnel (excluding those assigned in GHQ since their salaries are handled by the AFP Finance Center) is 20,496 or 782 more than O-N1’s total. Simply put, the Navy is paying an additional 782 personnel whose whereabouts are unknown.

*These ‘ghost personnel’ came from those who have left the service through attrition, AWOL, retirement, death, etc., and have not been dropped deliberately from the payroll.

Case Illustration #9

Each officer assigned in the Headquarters of the Philippine Navy (HPN) receives an average of P3,000 monthly as ‘incentive pay.’ To afford this, the HPN prepares documents for ‘ghost deliveries’ also known as ‘conversion.’ At 193 officers, this would amount to almost P600,000 a month.

*This is done in almost all major units that have the authority to procure. Other variations of this are overpricing, under delivery and substitution. This is easily done because of collusion between dealers and all those involved in the procurement process. The COA Auditors turn a blind eye to these irregularities because they receive commissions equivalent to 1-2 percent of the total amount in the purchase orders. A Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism report further states that: “After 1991, negotiated deals became the norm, with the AFP going straight to the President for whatever big purchase it wants to make. Nearly all these deals turned disadvantageous — if not downright disastrous — to troops in the end…officers say that corruption has become so pervasive in the AFP that the crooks in their midst have evolved a vocabulary of their own. For instance, one colonel said, ‘cost of money’ means ’the amount a proponent pays to facilitators for making his dreams come true.’ ’Cleared money,’ meanwhile, is ‘money (procurement budget) that has been converted (to other uses), which one could spend anywhere.’ Put another way, it is ‘laundered money,’ he said. Contractors for their part said that the evolving consensus among them is that some service commands are more corrupt than others. Their integrity meter puts the Army on top, followed by General Headquarters, and then the Navy. The Air Force ranks last, they said, for allegedly being the most corrupt. ‘Overpricing’ in the Navy is about 100 to 200 percent”(Mangahas, 2001).

EFFECTS ON NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The direct effects of corruption in the Navy on national development are staggering. It affects the economy through the systemic rape of the funds entrusted to it. These include losses from the ghost payroll, ghost repairs, ghost deliveries/conversion, pilferage of fuel, overpriced purchases, etc.

Indirectly, the effects are so much worse. According to Tangco: “Smugglers, poachers and pirates rob the economy of billions in lost revenue and taxes, ultimately sapping the strength of local industries and commerce and often times inflicting serious damage on the natural environment.”(Tangco, 1998: 177)

Then “Senator Orlando Mercado, who chairs the Senate Committee on national defense and security, estimates that around 600,000 metric tons of fish worth an astounding P50 billion are lost annually due to poaching by foreign fishing vessels.” (Tangco, 1998: 177)

Even more alarming is its indirect effect on national security. Thousands of people have already died in the decades-old secessionist war even as the government continue to spend billions trying to contain secessionists and bandits on the ground, when they could have been greatly weakened simply by a sustained naval presence. The existence of the MILF hinges on its unimpeded supply lines from sympathetic countries that pass through sealanes wittingly provided by the Navy primarily because of corruption.

As for the Abu Sayyaf, while it may be true that they have fast kumpits, these boats are still detectable by radar and would not last long in a hot pursuit. Besides, they are not known to go island-hopping if they knew that there were Navy boats patrolling the high seas.

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

The prospects for the future of the Navy have been defined by two recent events: the success story that happened at the Naval Education and Training Command (NETC) in 2000 and the PN leadership crisis on February 2001 which involved Rear Admiral Guillermo G. Wong AFP and the Philippine Marines.

The NETC is the training arm of the Navy. It is responsible for the conduct of basic, advanced and specialization courses for officers and enlisted personnel. Since NETC is technically a school, bulk of its purchases are for uniforms and accessories; school/office supplies; and training materials. With an annual budget of P169 million (P121 million for salaries and P48 million for supplies, based on the NETC OPB for CY – 2000), the NETC had become the object of larceny by previous Commanders, which resulted to the corrosion of the whole training system of the Navy.

In December 1999, Commodore Ruben G. Domingo AFP assumed as Commander of NETC. Knowing the dark history of his unit and the tasks at hand, he immediately set into motion a reform program centered at the cleansing of the procurement system. And the result was astounding. In one year, the NETC, not only accomplished its mission of conducting all programmed courses, it had also accumulated P5 million worth of savings. These savings were then used to improve other training facilities and equipment. The complete eradication of corruption was achieved. He did this, first, by removing suspected scalawags from staff positions then replacing them with officers whom he perceived as still unstained by the grime of corruption. Then, Commo. Domingo simply instructed everyone to do things ‘by the book.’ Particularly, the religious and transparent implementation of canvassing and bidding procedures of procurement set forth by existing laws and guidelines. No “conversion” or “substitution” was allowed. As a safety net, he involved the Intelligence division to monitor the process and set up entrapment operations whenever necessary.

Surprisingly, Commo. Domingo’s reform program did not resemble the “radical redesigning” concept of Reengineering (Hammer, 1993), the “entrepreneurial government” spirit espoused by the Reinventing Government (Osborne, 1990) nor was it a form of “Neo-Taylorism” (Reyes 1998, 189). Its only main components were his technical competence, moral integrity and political will as a Commander; specifically, the technical competence to formulate reforms, and the moral integrity and political will to enforce them.

In December 2000, when RAdm. Guillermo G. Wong AFP assumed as Flag- Officer-In-Command (FOIC) of the Philippine Navy everybody in the Navy expected radical changes. RAdm. Wong, who had a reputation of being incorruptible, had envisioned a totally corrupt-free Navy. Upon assumption, he went on a “crusading mode” by “going to several places trying to clean up the Navy” (Pazzibugan, 2001). In February 2001, the Navy (and the AFP) was rocked by a leadership crisis when the Philippine Marines demanded the relief of the RAdm. Wong (Pazzibugan, 2001). The crisis was triggered by the berating of the Marines by RAdm. Wong for alleged irregularities in the procurement of P3.8 million worth of Kevlar Helmets (Pablo, 2001). In the events that followed, President Arroyo left the crisis to be resolved by then AFP Chief of Staff General Angelo Reyes (Pablo, 2001), who offered Wong the command of the newly formed Northern Command as a concession for his being relieved as FOIC. RAdm. Wong, realizing that this was a demotion, opted to resign (Pazzibugan, 2001). Later on President Arroyo was “asked if she was satisfied with the way Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Reyes had handled the conflict between Wong and the Marine Corps, The President said Reyes had done the right thing.” (Pablo, 2001). RAdm. Wong was eventually replaced by Rear Admiral Hingco, whose policy was to disregard all reforms initiated by his predecessor and revert to the previous status quo.

For a President and Commander-in-Chief, whose government was supposed to be founded on such slogans as ‘New Politics,’ moral regeneration and good governance, to say that what General Reyes did was the right thing was truly demoralizing to say the least. This was the first indication of the type of leadership the AFP will expect from its Commander-in-Chief. RAdm. Wong should have been fully backed by his Chief of Staff and his Commander-in-Chief as he was on the right and principled side. More importantly, he was the foremost practitioner of good governance and, certainly, someone who has both the moral ascendancy and political will to effect change in the Navy. Unfortunately, according to the ‘New Politics’ philosophy of President Arroyo, this is not so.

The two events narrated symbolize both hope and despair. Hope in that there is still a chance for the Navy to get out of the hole its officers and former officers had created. And despair at the thought that this chance is reliant on a politics- administration dichotomy (Wilson, 1887), which was best described by Dr. Danilo R. Reyes in one of his lectures as a mere ‘pretender’ paradigm.

CONCLUSION

The corruption problem in the Philippine Navy is grave. The direct and indirect damages to our economy, national security and peace and order in terms of costs and lives lost had been devastating and continuous; thus, impeding our efforts in national development.

The obsolescence and shortage of operating assets of the Navy’s fleet are not the reasons for its ineffectiveness, but they are the results of years of malversation of funds. But ill-equipped as it is, the Navy is still very capable of ISO and MARLEN operations if only there are COs and officers who have enough moral decency to be faithful to their mandated tasks.

The corruption had become systemic and has eaten through the very core of the organization, and infecting, practically all levels of the bureaucracy and all areas of operation.

The future of the Navy is clouded by mixed insights. On one hand, the success of the NETC model was a ray of light amidst the darkness of moral decadence. It proved that total eradication of corruption in a major unit in the Navy is possible. The next step is magnifying this accomplishment to a higher plane, the Philippine Navy Command itself. More importantly, it showed how it could be done simply through the Commander’s political will with moral integrity and technical competence as primary requisites.

On the other hand, however, this will only be possible if the next crusading Flag- Officer-In-Command would be fully supported by a Commander-in-Chief who possesses strong leadership qualities and who would not allow political concessions and political indebtedness be the bases of his/her decision-making regarding AFP matters. This way, the whole AFP Officer Corps will not get the impression that they are being treated as an organization of untouchables who can get away with anything.

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